A Process of Denial: Bork and
Post-Modern Conservatism
James Boyle·

[I]t is naive to suppose that the [Supreme] Court's present difficulties could be cured by appointing Justices determined to give the
Constitution "its true meaning," to work at "finding the law"
instead of reforming society. The possibility implied by these comforting phrases does not exist. . . . History can be of considerable
help, but it tells us much too little about the specific intentions of the
men who framed, adopted and ratified the great clauses. The record
is incomplete, the men involved often had vague or even conflicting
intentions, and no one foresaw, or could have foreseen, the disputes
that changing social conditions and outlooks would bring before the
Court.
Robert Bork 1
INTRODUCTION

As you might guess from the title, Robert Bork's latest work, The
Tempting ofAmerica, 2 is a book about the Fall-both America's and Mr.
Bork's own. It will not surprise many readers to. find that the two are
linked, or that the "temptation" to which Mr. Bork refers is that of politics. In particular, he warns us of an increasing politicization of the
American legal system. This politicization is caused primarily by judges
who desert the original understanding of the Constitution and, under the
guise of "interpretation," attempt instead to impose their own individual
notions of justice on the cases before them. Mr. Bork conveys these
messages in a book which is part autobiography and part legal theory,
inspired by the ordeal which brought him to fame: the Senate's judicial
confirmation process. In his case, of course, it was actually a process of
denial. Unfortunately, so is the book.
• © James Boyle 1991. Thanks go to Lauren Dame, Bob Gordon, Andrea Ball, Jae Won Kim,
Jamin Raskin, Jim May, and Mark Hager. This article is dedicated to Burt Wechsler-a lawyer for
the powerless since before I was born, who is a colleague of ten years and an inspiration for life.
1. Bork, The Supreme Coun Needs a New Philosophy, FORTUNE, December 1968, at 140-1.
2. R. Bork, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990)
[hereinafter cited in text).
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Although this article was prompted by the publication of The Tempting of America, its subject is wider than that book alone. As I went further back into Mr. Bork's intellectual history, I discovered that the
arguments in his most recent book followed a formula developed in his
earlier writings. Like The Tempting of America, Mr. Bork's other works
follow a lapsarian pattern-a tale of a fall from grace, coupled with a
strategy for redemption. Mr. Bork identifies a state of corruption and
decay in some institution or area oflaw. He traces the rot to a particular
departure from the proper state of affairs, a willful violation of an authoritatively decreed scheme of things. He then prescribes a method which
will allow us to escape our current fallen state and return to a condition
of righteousness. Mr. Bork speaks strongly in favor of his method, pronouncing it "inescapable" or "unavoidable." Yet it is obvious that Mr.
Bork's panacea has all the same features as the disease it is supposed to
cure, despite Mr. Bork's lengthy and thunderous denial that this is the
case. Eventually, he falls silent for a while, only to emerge two or three
years later with some new, and newly ineluctable, redemptive method.
The process then repeats itself. Readers familiar only with Mr. Bork's
most recent writings will be surprised to find that in the past he has been,
successively, a believer in libertarianism, process theory, judicial
restraint, natural rights, neutral principles, law and economics, and two
distinct forms of originalism. At the time, each of these theories was
offered as the only possible remedy to the SUbjectivity and arbitrariness of
value judgements in a constitutional democracy, while the other theories
he had held, or was about to hold, were rejected out of hand.
The Tempting of America is, in one sense, the weakest and most obviously flawed of Mr. Bork's panaceas. He criticizes contemporary liberal
constitutional jurisprudence for being arbitrary, politically biased, indeterminate, and ahistorical. Yet his prescription for cure--the philosophy
of original understanding-is even more obviously flawed in these ways.
Indeed, as the quotation at the beginning of this piece demonstrates, in
an earlier incarnation he himself dismissed originalism as "naive." Mr.
Bork's rhetoric of denial must be correspondingly stronger and more
thunderous. Yet in another sense, The Tempting of America marks a
departure, albeit a fragmentary and contradictory one, from the endless
process of denial. It reveals a shift to a different form of conservative
thought, one that could be called pre-modem, or even post-modem. For
these reasons, among others, it behooves us to pay more attention to Mr.
Bork's most recent argument than its surface confusion and dogma
might first appear to deserve.
I

Every Eden has its own forbidden fruit, its own great serpents. Mr.
Bork's forbidden fruit is politics, his serpents are the members of a liberal
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elite in legal academia. More broadly, the villains of the piece are those
in the "intellectual or knDwledge class," "who work, however adroitly or
maladroitly, with words and ideas" (p. 8). This class "tend[s] to have
values antagonistic to a traditional, bourgeois society. It is not too much
to say that these people see the Constitution as a weapon in a class struggle about social and political values" (p. 8). Despite the fact that he
appears to work (however adroitly or maladroitly) with words and ideas,
Mr. Bork is not a card-carrying member of this knowledge class. Like
Karl Marx, he has managed to escape from the class-determined attitudes he describes.
Mr. Bork's plot is a relatively simple one. The knowledge class comes
to realize that the values of the real Constitution (as interpreted by the
Framers, their contemporary audience, and Mr. Bork) are hostile to their
predilection for sexual freedom and egalitarian social reform. Unwilling
to accept this limitation on their desires, they decide 3 to subvert the true
meaning of the document. They have a number of strategies to achieve
this goal, including political opposition to judges who do not share their
ideas of the Constitution. Understandably, Mr. Bork thinks this a particularly pernicious thing to do. But the liberal elite are not content merely
to block those with whom they disagree. They wish to transform constitutional debate, to marginalize originalism by treating it as just one
method of interpretation among many, perhaps to root it out altogether.
The knowledge class receives help in its "heresy" (p. 7) from a number of
well-meaning but unsophisticated judges who yearn to do justice, from a
public unwilling to listen to discussions of constitutional theory, and
from a perverse judicial tendency, as old as Marbury v. Madison, occasionally to ignore the manifest good sense of the philosophy of original
understanding.
The knowledge class's success has cost the law dearly in terms of legitimacy. "Since the politicization of law has, for half a century, moved
results steadily to the left, a very large number of Americans do not like
those outcomes" (p. 2). The Tempting of America is, in effect, a clarion
call to warn the general public of the dangers of continuing down this
road and to rally Americans around the flag of originalism. It should be
noted that originalism does not mean original intent. Mr. Bork used to
think it blindingly obvious that the Constitution's true meaning was
determined by the original intent of the Framers. Now he finds it equally
obvious that the Framers' intentions are irrelevant and that the true
meaning of the Constitution is determined by the way it would have been
understood by the Framers' contemporaries. This new position is so
3. I use the word advisedly. Despite occasional comments to the contrary, Mr. Bork seems to
envisage a set of conscious actions to "subvert" the Constitution, rather than the unconscious
working out of a set of class-based ideas and attitudes. In this respect, of course, he parts company
with Marx.

266

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

[Vol. 3: 263

obvious to Mr. Bork that he doesn't mind imposing it on candidates for
the jUdiciary. Indeed, "[o]ne purpose of this book is to persuade Americans that no person should be nominated or confirmed who does not
display both a grasp of and devotion to the philosophy of original understanding" (p. 9). At this point, one might legitimately ask Mr. Bork,
"Isn't this the very thing for which you castigate the liberals? Isn't this
the imposition of a politically-based loyalty oath for judicial method?"
Mr. Bork's response seems to boil down to an assertion that his method,
unlike those the liberals seek to impose, is right.
It would be a mistake to end our reading of Mr. Bork with this realization, however. His arguments may be shallow, dogmatic, ahistorical,
logically flawed, and inconsistent with his own past writings. But this is
only part of the story. This book reveals a great deal about the relationship between conservative ideology and the law, an issue which, given the
current composition of the federal bench, will continue to be of considerable interest. The Tempting of America will take its place as the leading
exposition of the philosophy of original understanding. For reasons I will
give later, originalism is likely to be the only conservative legal theory
with significant appeal to a mass audience. Thus, Mr. Bork's book has
considerable political and iconographic significance.
The significance of the book becomes even clearer if we focus on the
two warring sides of Mr. Bork's argument. The first and most obvious is
an unsuccessful but relatively conventional attempt to satisfy the requirements of liberal rationalist social thought. In other words, he attempts to
prove that the theory of original understanding is neutral, objective,
unprejudiced and, in general, a rational analysis of the social world. The
second and less obvious side of the book is the more interesting. Scattered throughout this work. are fragmentary arguments and statements
which, if pieced together, represent a fundamental conservative challenge
to the framework of liberal rationalism, the very framework into which
Mr. Bork has been trying to shoehorn his ideas. This challenge could be
described as Burkean conservatism. Or, given its low opinion of the
value of rationality, its critique of liberal epistemology, and its cut-andpaste approach to historical tradition, it could with equal justice be called
"post-modern conservatism." Because it does not fit within the ruling
epistemology, most readers will not even recognize this second argument
as an argument. It is exactly for that reason that it deserves our
attention.
Mr. Bork's book presents us-albeit in confused and contradictory
form-with a strand of conservatism long neglected in the United States,
a strand often identified with its most famous proponent, Edmund
Burke. Thus, it gives us the opportunity to examine a striking historical
parallel. Writing against the French Revolution, at the beginning of "the
Age of Reason," Burke spoke out in favor of established hierarchies and

Boyle

1991]

267

a-rational tradition, and against the "delusive plausibilities of moral politicians."4 He argued that the attempt to understand the social world
using only the "fallible and feeble" tools of reason was marked by both
hubris and danger. Mr. Bork, writing in a post-modem era hailed by
some as the twilight of reason, strikes exactly the same chords, though
with less style and assurance. Is this a return to a pre-modem (or even
the rise of a post-modem) conservatism?!!
I will begin this article by discussing Mr. Bork's importance to current
conservative legal theory.6 After concluding that the theory of original
intent (and to a lesser degree, of original understanding) is one of the
most popularly acceptable of the available conservative legal theories, I
will devote the middle portion of the article to an examination of the
intellectual odyssey which led Mr. Bork to make his way through each of
those theories before holding the ideas he does now. I will prove, in fact,
that Mr. Bork is the only conservative legal theorist who has held every
conservative legal theory. Having shown how Mr. Bork developed his
recent ideas about original understanding, I will assess their interpretive,
historical, and logical merits. After demonstrating that Mr. Bork's most
recent theory fails on all counts, I will discuss the structure that it has in
common with his earlier work. Finally, using that structure as a tool, I
will develop the part of his current ideas which challenges the epistemology of liberal rationalism and discuss its possible significance for conservative thought in general.
II.

BORK AND CONSERVATIVE LEGAL THEORY

There have been enormous strides in conservative legal theory in
4. Burke, infra note 85, at 125.
5. As the reader will gather from this article, my interest is less in intellectual taxonomy, than in
exploring certain similar challenges which both pre-modem (republican, Burkean) and post-modem
thought present to the tradition of liberal rationalism. For the post-modem side of the story see
HASSAN, POSTmodernISM' A Paracritical Bibliography, in PARACRITICISMS: SEVEN
SPECULATIONS OF THE TIMES 39 (1973); J. KRISTEVA, DESIRE IN LANGUAGE (L. Roudiez ed.
1979). Post-modem work is marked by a skepticism about the limits of abstract, rational discourse
(see, e.g. J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976», and about the accuracy of political theories
built around the notion of "the subject," a rights-holding individual divorced from culture, tradition,
language, and history (see, e.g., M. FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS (1976». Stylistically it
tends to rely on what David Kennedy calls "ironic conformity"-recreating tradition and history
even as it uses them. Interestingly, Burkean conservatism is also marked by these three
characteristics, although it is, of course, very different in other ways-stodgier in sentiment, more
reactionary in declared political vision, less pretentious in persona, and infinitely superior in writing
style. At first, the similarity seems bizarre. A moment's thought supplies a possible reason. Since
each of these three characteristics was developed largely out of opposition to the dominant
epistemology and political tradition of the Age of Reason, it is hardly surprising that they are
encountered in works from both the beginning and the supposed end of that tradition. See Boyle,
The Politics of Reason, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985). Having pointed out that both Burkean and
post-modem thought present a challenge to some of liberal rationalism'S fundamental premises,
rather than an argument within those premises, I have exhausted my interest in intellectual
taxonomy and the reader need fear no further footnotes like this one.
6. In order to avoid endless quibbles about definition, I use the term "conservative" to refer to
those who would use that term, among others, to describe their own political views.
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recent years. They were sorely needed. With some notable exceptions, 7
conservative legal thought once consisted largely of bombast, red-baiting,
and formalism. In the last fifteen years, that situation has changed dramatically. A number of distinct schools of conservative legal thought
have appeared, providing conservative judges, administrators, and policy
makers with a wealth of contradictory but persuasive advice on how best
to use their newly-acquired power. The Tempting ofAmerica is best read
as the leading statement of one of these schools. To understand its
importance we must first look at the competition.
One of the most obvious contributions to conservative legal theory
comes from the economic analysis of law. The Chicago school of law
and economics has reconceptualized the legal system as a "rights market," where decision makers are asked to allocate rights to the person
who would pay the most for them under conditions of perfect competition. 8 This has the happy effect offavoring the rich over the poor, and all
in the name of science. It also means that we can extend the ideology of
the market to the last few areas, such as adoption, civil rights and the
criminal law, which still have the temerity to resist it. In case anyone
should imagine that this is merely an academic movement, it should be
remembered that its chief proponent is now a federal judge. It is also
instructive, if not actually frightening, to find that half of all federal
judges have already attended corporate-funded courses in law and economics, arousing considerable concern over the ethical propriety of their
actions.
Alternatively, for those less enamored of the dismal science, there are
libertarian legal theories. Libertarians place the takings clause at the
center of the Constitution, and read it broadly to cover much of governmental activity. "All regulations, all taxes, and all modifications of liability rules are takings of private property prima facie compensable by
the state."9 They argue that the jUdiciary should move towards a minimalist state by striking down everything within the broad reach of the
takings clause. This analysis results in the conclusion that the New Deal
is unconstitutional, as are the minimum wage, worker's compensation,
rent control, social security and progressive taxation. Sadly, the libertarian concern for takings of private property does not extend to those who
have suffered the greatest losses in the past-Native Americans and African Americans in particular.
7.
8.

A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
See R. POSNER, THE EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1986); M. POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO EcONOMIC ANALYSIS (1989); Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of
Law, 5 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1975); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A
Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Studies and
Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985).
9. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DoMAIN 95
(1985).
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Both law and economics and libertarianism require a degree of "judicial activism" which undermines the notion that conservatives are automatically proponents of "judicial restraint." Nevertheless, some still
believe that the first job of a conservative legal theory is to limit the
power of the judiciary. To this end it has been suggested that Congress
should be capable of overruling federal or Supreme Court decisions, or
that a seven member majority on the Court should be required to strike
down federal or state law. 10 Legislation was also proposed which would
have made it an impeachable offense for federal judges to order governmental expenditures for a specific purpose, when a legislature has not
authorized and appropriated funds for that purpose. 11 Those who prefer
brief solutions will like the suggestion that Congress should simply
remove "controversial political and social questions from the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.,,12 Since every issue which comes to
the Supreme Court seems like a controversial social issue to someone,
such a solution would have the indirect benefit of making a valuable plot
of real estate on First Street N.E. available for development.
Social conservatives have been less prominently represented in the
academy, but no less influential in decision-making. Members of this
group have led the attack on Roe v. Wade, convinced the Supreme Court
that there is no constitutional bar to criminalizing all sexual acts beyond
the heterosexual missionary position, persuaded the Justice Department
to oppose affirmative action, and held out the possibility that divorce
should be restricted and perhaps abolished. "In a case of a traditional
church marriage, where the couple has exchanged the usual vows 'for
richer or poorer, in sickness and in health, till death us do part', there is
no reason why they should not be held to their contract.,,13 A passage
from the same work gives some notion of the social conservative attitude
towards equal opportunity law and women's rights.
The strains imposed on the family by equal opportunity are enormous-husbands competing with their own wives, men and women
entering into marriage "so long as love shall last," mothers feeling
compelled to abandon their families for a career or to satisfy their
sexual appetites. The real effect of this collective delusion of
women's rights is only to reduce the once sovereign family to a support system for various governmental agencies. 14
10. A useful summary of such proposals can be found in Stanmeyer, Judicial Supremacy, in THE
NEW RIGHT PAPERS 142, 163-65 (R. Whitaker ed. 1982). Professor Stanmeyer is in favor of some,
but not all, of these suggestions. As his title suggests, his concern is most directly with judicial
supremacy rather than judicial activism, though it seems clear that he believes the two to be
integrally related.
11. [d. at 163.
12. [d. at 164.
13. Fleming, Old Rights and the New Right, in THE NEW RIGHT PAPERS 180, 196 (R. Whitaker
ed. 1982). Dr. Fleming later extends his argument to civil ceremonies.
14. [d. at 196-97.
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On the strategic level of national politics, Bork's book is important
precisely because so many people would find these other conservative
legal movements to be either too complicated or too wacky. Perhaps
both. I hasten to say that this is not a judgement about the actual merits
of conservative ideas. Judge Posner gets justifiably upset when people
ignore the rest of his brilliant and prodigious opus and focus on only his
baby-selling article, even comparing his suggestions to Swift's A Modest
Proposal. There is certainly intellectual substance to the idea that markets ration scarce resources----in this case, babies----better than do bureaucracies. Nevertheless, there is an undeniable reaction of moral and
emotional outrage at economic discussions of the efficient level of crime
or the economics of the baby shortage. The depth of outrage at suggestions like this makes it likely that, as a popular national platform for
conservative legal reform, law and economics has even less of a chance
than bimetallism. Behind the scenes, of course, it is likely to be more and
more important.
As for the libertarian ideal, it is certainly true that property exercises a
peculiar fascination over the affections of mankind. Nevertheless, it is
hard to imagine a popular political or legal movement built around the
idea that the New Deal is unconstitutional, or that the takings clause is
the center of the Constitution. An unalloyed philosophy of judicial
restraint is also unlikely to have much appeal, either to the public or to
conservative judges revelling in their new found powers.
When it comes to social conservatism, I have found that a lot of Americans, and not merely the members of Mr. Bork's knowledge class, have a
yen for sexual freedom and "the delusion of women's rights." The
author who used that phrase and then suggested abolishing divorce,
described his creed in the following way; "when a Southerner calls himself a conservative, he is usually thinking of a way of life, of a social and
moral order for which the people of the 1860's went to war."lS Correct
me if I am wrong, but wasn't the name of that social and moral order
"slavery?" While I can believe much of American politics, I cannot
believe that slavery, or baby-selling, or even the abolition of the New
Deal (shortly followed by the Supreme Court) would form the basis of an
extraordinarily popular conservative legal movement. And that is where
Mr. Bork comes in.
Mr. Bork's book is tailor-made for popular appeal. It is weighty
enough to convince those who are not familiar with the material he discusses, and shallow enough to be capable of quick summary in a talk
show or newspaper article. As I will show in the next section, the arguments against Mr. Bork's ideas are overwhelming, but sometimes complicated or dependent on a base of detailed historical knowledge. For these
15.

Id. at 184.
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reasons, the opposing arguments are unlikely to fare well in the orgy of
narcissism, cliche, and half truth which masquerades as public debate on
the nation's airwaves. But any detailed, scholarly, or merely honest analysis of Mr. Bork's ideas reveals a jurisprudence of dogma and sound-bites
and a version of history which bears the same relationship to the
Framer's ideas that Busch Gardens bears to Europe.
In one view, perhaps the dominant view, Mr. Bork's most recent book
is an alternately defensive and opportunistic response to his confirmation
hearings. The story goes something like this: Mr. Bork is a thoughtful
legal scholar and must surely recognize the problems with his theory. He
himself used to criticize originalism, before it became flavor of the month
at the Justice Department. Yet consider the alternatives open to him.
He can acknowledge that his theory of constitutional interpretation is
both incoherent and unworkable. But to do so would be to legitimate the
painful criticism to which he was subject during the hearings. Alternatively, he can turn his back on scholarship and real history, becoming
instead a revered video pundit of the right, bearing the scars of honorable
battle and a theory that can be explained between commercial breaks.
Who can be surprised when he chooses the latter course? Who can be
surprised to find that his theory fails to confront the objections raised to
it? Who can be surprised that his book consists instead of a process of
denial--denial of philosophical problems, historical problems, logical
problems, and finally, denial of personal inconsistency?
Yet there is another way of viewing this book. Perhaps The Tempting
ofAmerica should not be seen as the defensive and disingenuous product
of the confirmation hearings. Instead, it may best be seen as the culmination of a prominent conservative's intellectual odyssey, the end of a trek
through each of the prevalent schools of conservative legal thought. In
the next section I will suggest that Mr. Bork has measured each of the
ideas he has held by its ability to offer a coherent conservative vision of
how a society is to be run if values are not subject to rational discussion.
If this is true, then the fact that he ends up with the theory of original
understanding is particularly fascinating. What does originalism, which
seems the weakest of the conservative theories, offer that the others do
not?

III.

Is

BORK A BORKEAN?

Mr. Bork has had a colorful career. Before becoming a judge, he was a
practicing lawyer, a Yale law professor, and then a Solicitor General of
the United States. His term in the latter office "included some duties not
listed in [the] job description, among them writing briefs against Vice
President Spiro Agnew ... and the firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald
Cox in what was known as the Saturday night massacre" (p. 272). Certain members of the knowledge class suggested during Mr. Bork's confir-
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mation hearings that the latter act did not reflect well upon him. He
feels, however, that "[t]hese are stories that may be left for another time"
(Id. ). I will bow to his wishes, turning instead to the changes in his
intellectual position over the last twenty-five years.
Mr. Bork's intellectual history is a fascinating odyssey through all of
the major theories of twentieth century conservative legal thought. At
one time or another, Mr. Bork has held them all-and always passionately. In this sense, he is a conservative Everyman, and his odyssey
presents the development of conservative legal thought in microcosm.
This makes his current position all the more interesting.
In 1963, when conservatives were worried that Congress might force
whites to open their hotels and restaurants to Blacks, Mr. Bork was a
libertarian with a high regard for individual freedom of association. He
had this to say about the Interstate Accommodations Act:
The legislature would inform a substantial body of the citizenry that
in order to carry on the trades in which they are established they
must deal with and serve persons with whom they do not wish to
associate.... The fact that the coerced scale of preferences is said to
be rooted in a moral order does not alter the impact upon freedom.
In a society that purports to value freedom as an end in itself, the
simple argument from morality to law can be a dangerous non
sequitur.... The principle of such legislation is that if I find your
behavior ugly by my standards, moral or aesthetic, and if you prove
stubborn about adopting my view of the situation, I am justified in
having the state coerce you into more righteous paths. That is itself
a principle of unsurpassed ugliness. 16
Five years later, when he published Why I Am For Nixon,1' and The
Supreme Court Needs A New Phiiosophy,18 Mr. Bork's judicial philosophy was largely cast in the form of a critique of the Warren Court, whose
result-oriented jurisprudence had tempted judges with a knowledge they
were forbidden to possess. The latter article is particularly interesting.
In it, Mr. Bork argued that "[t]he Warren Court ... challenges us to
think again whether there is or can be any substance to the distinction
between law and politics."19 The article goes in search of some theoretical basis for that distinction. Bork concluded that it is "naive" to take
the position which he now espouses, that is, to insist simply that the
Court "give the Constitution its 'true meaning.' The possibility implied
by those comforting phrases does not exist."20 In a passage which will
16. Bork,
17. Bork,
18. Bork,
19. Id.
20. Id. at

Civil Rights-A Challenge, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21.
Why I Am For Nixon, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June I, 1968, at 19.
The Supreme Court Needs a New Philosophy, FORTUNE, Dec. 1968, at 138.
140.
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surely surprise some of his more recent readers, Bork even quoted Robert
Penn Warren for the truth of the legal realist view of law.
Every thoughtful working lawyer has shared the insight expressed
by Willy Stark, the Huey Long-like politician in All the King's Men
and a legal realist if ever there was one. "The law," he said, "is like
a single-bed blanket on a double bed and three folks in the bed and a
cold night. There ain't ever enough blanket to cover the case, no
matter how much pulling and hauling." The question, then, is not
whether courts should make law, but how and from what
materials?l
Answering his own question, Mr. Bork tried and rejected a number of
alternative "materials." Relying on the traditional materials, "the text
of the Constitution, history and precedent," will not solve the realist
dilemma. "[S]ometimes they dictate results. But more often these
sources suggest that the Court must enter a field and yet do not answer
the important questions found there." Probably the most striking passage is the one quoted at the beginning of this article, in which Bork
specifically rejects the originalist position.
History can be of considerable help, but it tells us much too little
about the specific intentions of the men who framed, adopted, and
ratified the great clauses. The record is incomplete, the men
involved often had vague or even conflicting intentions, and no one
foresaw, or could have foreseen, the disputes that changing social
conditions and outlooks would bring before the Court. 22
Bork concluded that Willy Stark and the Yale legal realists were "dead
right about the inadequacy of the traditional sources of law.'>23
The new philosophy Mr. Bork offered was an interesting hybrid. It
was a kind of process theory which combined an argument like Bickel's
for judicial restraint with a Wechslerian argument for judicial activism
when necessary to safeguard deductively-generated "natural rights."
Mr. Bork stitched these disparate elements together with his usual conviction and self-assurance.
Where the Constitution does not thrust it into a field, a restrained
Supreme Court would deal with the processes by which the policies
of representative institutions are made and applied, rather than with
the substance of the policies. Intervention coupled with refusal to
pass on substance does not entail a contradiction. . . . In his book
The Least Dangerous Branch, Professor Alexander Bickel of Yale
has analyzed the rich and subtle repertory of judicial techniques
available to educate, to frame, and to expose issues for other
Id.
22. Id. at 141.
23. Id.
21.
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branches of government, to require them to face up to hard choices
and their consequences. Restraint entails not so much a reduced as
a different role for the Court, one better suited to democratic society
than the role now played by the Warren Court. 24
The traditional conservative's preference for judicial restraint is subject to the Madisonian imperative that the court intervene in order to
protect minorities from majorities.
A desire for some legitimate form of judicial activism is inherent in a
tradition that runs strong in our culture, a tradition that can be
called "Madisonian." We continue to believe that there are some
things no majority should be allowed to do to us, no matter how
democratically it may decide to do them. . . . [T]here are some
aspects of life a majority should not control . . . coercion in such
matters is tyranny, a violation of the individual's natural rights....
Clearly, the definition of natural rights cannot be left to either the
majority or the minority. . . . This requires the Court to have, and
demonstrate the validity of, a theory of natural rights. 25
The theory of natural rights turns out to be more "conventional" than
"natural." "Working in the method familiar to lawyers trained in the
common law, the judge can construct principles that explain existing
constitutional rights and extrapolate from them to define new natural
rights."26 Having rejected as "naive" a search for the historically defined
lines the elder Mr. Bork will find so easily, the younger Mr. Bork offers
less tangible, "intersubjective" constraints on this process.
In proceeding to derive new rights, the courts must be controlled by
the methods and disciplines that lawyers call craftsmanship. . . .
Only in this way, so far as I can see, can we begin to meet the plea
made by Professor Herbert Wechsler of Columbia for "neutral principles" of constitutionallaw. 27
If readers are a little surprised by this realist, activist Bork, who began

his analysis from the necessity of courts making law, they will also be
surprised by the "neutral" set of natural rights he managed to "derive."
In 1968, it was obvious to Mr. Bork that the first amendment, correctly
interpreted, protected not only political but also non-political speech.28
The implications, however, went much further:
[N]on-political speech too, of course, is entitled to some degree of
constitutional protection. Brandeis cited other values of speech that
are not unique to the political variety. For both speaker and hearer,
speech may be a source of enjoyment, of self-fulfillment, of personal
24.
25.
26.
27.

28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 166, 168.
at 168-70.
at 170.
at 168-70.
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development. It is often mundane or vulgar or self-serving, but it
may be exalted, inspired by the highest motives. It may affect attitudes that ultimately impinge on the political process. All this has
implications that, though generally overlooked, seem inescapable.
For in these respects nonpolitical speech does not differ from nonverbal behavior, whether it customarily bears the label "sexual,"
"economic," "artistic," or some other. One could argue, then, that
all human behavior should be entitled to the same level of constitutional consideration, the same judicial scrutiny of governmental regulation, that is currently afforded to nonpolitical speech. 29
After generalizing first amendment protection to all human behavior,
Mr. Bork modestly offered a way to draw a line between the wishes of the
majority and the rights of the minority.
[M]oral disapproval alone cannot be accepted as a sufficient rationale for any coercion. . . . The Court can draw a line, applicable to
many more situations than the "right of privacy" enunciated in
Griswold, by ruling that the majority may prohibit morally or aesthetically offensive nonpolitical behavior where the public must
observe it, but cannot reach conduct out of sight on such a rationale.
Both majority and minority may feel some pain at their respective
limitations, but the line does preserve an enclave of freedom while
minimizing the pain felt by the majority.30
There is a certain poignancy in this confident display of Mr. Bork's
libertarian persona, akin to the feeling one has looking at photographs of
a doomed individual, still full of vigor, unaware of the fate that awaits
him. By 1990, Mr. Bork would believe that a majority must legislate
morality if it is not to "dissolve social bonds" (p. 249). In 1968, however,
he could hardly have championed libertarianism more vigorously. At
that moment, a constitutional order created by Mr. Bork would probably
have resembled Professor Epstein's world, where "all regulations, all
taxes, and all modifications of liability rules are takings of private property prima facie compensable by the state"3! and where the acceptable
reasons for state intervention in individual behavior are few indeed. This
position is the logical conclusion of the ideas Bork held in 1963 when he
wrote that the prohibition of racial exclusion in public lodging embodied
a "principle of unsurpassed ugliness"32 because it interfered with individualliberty. It is hardly surprising, then, that five years later, he thought
it "inescapable" that all human behavior should be granted constitutional protection of the same kind as non-political speech. The quotation
above is perhaps the clearest example of the direction of his thought.
29.
30.
31.

32.

[d. at 170 (emphasis added).
[d. at 174.
R. EPSTEIN, supra note 9.
Bork, supra note 16.
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Notice how careful he is to carve out a sphere of private action free from
public moral regulation. The majority can interfere on moral grounds
only in what it can see, and even then there is lower level first amendment protection. The implications of this position are dramatic. Using
this sort of analysis, Bowers v. Hardwicp3 would certainly be overruled,
and there would be an overwhelmingly strong argument in support of
Roe v. Wade. 34
But after this five-year period of holding to the same line, Mr. Bork's
peripatetic intellect was straining at the leash. By 1971, the libertarian
side of Mr. Bork's ideas had crumbled, while reliance on Wechsler's theory of "neutral principles" had increased. The change was hardly subtle.
Nevertheless Bork described each of his different positions as unavoidable. Three years earlier he had believed it inescapable that the first
amendment covered all human behavior. Yet in his 1971 Indiana Law
Journal article, he could not see how to avoid the conclusion that the first
amendment covered only political speech, narrowly defined. 35 The principles of libertarianism seemed to have vanished from his thought.
Mr. Bork confessed to his change of heart, at least insofar as it implied
a reversal of his position on Griswold v. Connecticut. In 1968, together
with other commentators, he had thought that case "a salutary demonstration of the Court's ability to protect fundamental human values. "36
By 1971 Bork thought Griswold an "unprincipled decision," both its derivation and its definition being "utterly specious. ,,37 He offered as
"extenuation" for his change of heart that "at the time I thought, quite
erroneously, that new basic rights could be derived logically by finding
and extrapolating a more general principle of individual autonomy
underlying the particular guarantees of the Bill of Rights."38
As Mr. Bork's libertarian sentiments were gradually abandoned for
33. 478 u.s. 186 (1986) (upholding the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy).
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In fact, it is surprising how closely Mr. Bork's ideas mirror those of the
majority opinion in Roe, particularly in the way that liberty of choice is developed through an idea
that private choices are immune from majority scrutiny. Despite his later hostility to the "right of
privacy," Mr. Bork himself thinks that his expansion of the rationale of first amendment doctrine
goes considerably beyond Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). If economic activity is given
the protection associated with non-political speech, what about reproductive choice? The same point
can be made about his hostility to civil rights legislation. If interfering with whites' rights to refuse
black customers involves a "principle of unsurpassed ugliness," what about interfering with a
woman's control of her body? Finally, under Mr. Bork's public/private distinction, if an abortion
were carried on in private, even if a majority found it morally abhorrent, it would be protected. It
would appear that Mr. Bork's only possible response to this result would be to class abortion as a
"crime" and thus free it from his libertarian principles. Such a response exposes the circularity in
both sides of this argument (since the question of classification decides the analysis rather than
following from it) and also means that he must engage in substantive discussion of individual issues,
the very thing he claims to a void.
35. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 35 (1971).
36. [d. at 8 (citing Bork, supra note 1).
37. Bork. supra note 35, at 9. His disillusionment did not stop there. Nineteen years later,
Griswold seemed to him "a constitutional time bomb," id. at 95, a case that rivalled Dred Scott v.
Sandford, infra note 79, in its awfulness.
38. [d. at 8.
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"neutral principles," his ideas about interpretation were undergoing a
similar metamorphosis. In 1968 Mr. Bork had thought it "naive" to
imagine we could solve our problems merely by appointing judges determined to give the Constitution its "true meaning." "The possibility
implied by these comforting phrases does not exist. .. ."39 He had specifically pointed out that an originalist historical search told us "too little
about the specifics." At that time, he gave as an example the difficulty of
determining the level of generality of the Fourteenth Amendment. "History shows us that the equal protection clause (ratified a few years after
the Civil War) grew out of a concern about racial equality, but in crucial
respects the record leaves us unsure what was meant by equality and how
far beyond race the guarantee was intended to reach."4O Does it mandate
"black equality," "racial equality," or some wider vision? By 1971, history had become considerably clearer, so that Mr. Bork could say "[O]ne
thing the Court does know: [the fourteenth amendment] was intended to
enforce a core ideal of black equality against governmental discrimination.',41 As the years passed, the record was to become clearer still.
In 1980, Paul Brest made the same criticism of original understanding
that Bork himself had made in his 1968 article: the approach leaves open
the level of generality of the constitutional provision, and therefore the
judge must choose a level of abstraction. When Mr. Bork responds to
Brest's article in 1990, there is no trace of the methodological problems
which had once caused him to see indeterminacy in texts, precedents,
and historical records. "The role of a judge committed to the philosophy
of original understanding is not to 'choose a level of abstraction.' Rather
it is to find the meaning of a text-a process which includes finding its
degree of generality, which is part of its meaning" (p. 149). The methodological confidence is accompanied by some interesting substantive convictions about equal protection. Women and gays will have to make do
with a lower-level scrutiny as to whether any discrimination is "reasonable." In the case of gays, at least, reasonableness will almost always be
found. "Social treatment of homosexuals is based upon moral concerns
and it would be difficult to say that the various moral balances struck are
unreasonable" (p. 150). This is a far cry from the libertarian who wanted
to broaden the protection offered by Griswold to all human behavior.
As Mr. Bork's libertarianism waned and his theory of interpretation
changed, an associated shift in his moral epistemology was taking place.
Two sentences from his famous Indiana Law Journal article sum it up:
Unless we can distinguish forms of gratification, the only course for
a principled court is to let the majority have its way in both
39.
40.
41.

Bork, supra note 18, at 140-41.
[d.
Bork, supra note 35, at 14-15.
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cases.... There is no principled way to decide that one man's gratifications are more deserving of respect than another's or that one
form of gratification is more worthy than another. 42
.
In a footnote he elaborates: "The impossibility is related to that of making interpersonal comparisons of utilities ...43 The conclusion that economists draw from this premise is that matters of value must be left to the
market. In the Indiana article, Mr. Bork argues that they must be left to
the majority unless trumped by an overriding neutral principle derived
from the Constitution using the Wechslerian tools of generalization and
abstraction. 44 In The Tempting of America, the formulation is the same
but the content has changed: questions of value must be left to the majority unless the original understanding produces a principle that trumps
them. Mr. Bork now has the form of his basic argument, a form that can
be filled using his method of the moment.
So far, we have seen Mr. Bork hold most of the available conservative
legal theories I discussed earlier. He advocated in tum libertarianism,
traditional judicial restraint, judicial activism to enforce natural rights,
and Wechsler's theory of neutral principles. The only schools of thought
missing from the list are the economic analysis of law, social conservatism, and the philosophy of original intent. These, though, were soon to
follow.
During this entire period, Mr. Bork had been hard at work on the
articles later published as The Antitrust Paradox, which was finished in
1978. The shibboleths of his argument looked reasonably familiar.
Within the limited frame for observation provided by antitrust,
therefore, it is worth noting that the general movement has been
away from legislative decision by Congress and toward political
choice by courts, away from the idea of competition and toward the
older idea of protected status for each producer, away from concern
with general welfare and toward concern for interest groups, and
away from the ideal of liberty toward the idea of enforced equality.4s
Mr. Bork believed these trends to be "ultimately incompatible with the
preservation of a liberal capitalist social order...46 His prescription was a
fascinating one. At first it appears that Mr. Bork was proposing a form
of originalism in which "political choice by courts" is replaced by "legislative decision by Congress." The question then becomes, "Should the
antitrust statutes be enforced according to the original intent of Con42. Id. at 10.
43. Id. at n.20.
44. The Wechslerian method is required because of the vagaries of historical interpretation. Mr.
Bork is now willing to concede authoritativeness to the power of original intent, but has the same
critical view of its determinacy. "It is the fact that history does not reveal detailed choices ... that
permits, indeed requires, resort to other methods of interpretation." Id. at 13.
45. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978).
46. Id.
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gress?" Mr. Bork has some doubts. "Antitrust" he tells us, "is a subcategory of ideology.,,47
[Its] basic premises are mutually incompatible, and because some of
them are incorrect, the law has been producing increasingly bizarre
results. . . . The law must either undergo a difficult process of
reform, based upon a correct understanding of fundamental legal
and economic concepts, or resume its descent to the status of an
internal tariff against domestic competition and free trade. 48
At this point one might wonder where this "correct understanding"
would come from. A later Mr. Bork would surely rule out any source
but Congress's actual intentions, no matter how mistaken. Today's Mr.
Bork would look to the way the statutes were understood at the time of
passage, and not to subjective intentions. The Mr. Bork of 1968 might
have believed it possible to "derive" a new antitrust policy "logically by
finding and extrapolating a more general principle" underlying the "particular guarantees" of the antitrust statutes, but the Mr. Bork of 1971
had already pronounced that method erroneous. 49
As it turns out, the source of the "correct understanding" is something
of a mixture. Much of the basic argument in The Antitrust Paradox is
historical, but it is a history which serves Mr. Bork's ends. Most historians would agree that one of the goals of the antitrust rules was to prevent
the concentration of economic power in American society. Those who
wrote and passed the statutes believed enormous concentrations of economic power to be inherently subversive of the American republic. But
this is exactly the kind of egalitarian claptrap Mr. Bork will not tolerate.
Consequently, he feels free to apply the wisdom of modern economic
analysis to rectify the errors of Congress and the courts. so
Bork argues that the current principles of antitrust were never confirmed empirically, but admits that they do have history on their side.
"What is true is that our ideas are old; they carry whatever credentials
time alone can confer. The years 1890 to 1914 witnessed the origin of
every major theory that drives and directs the evolution of antitrust to
this day."sl Mr. Bork does not wholly reject the intentions of the framers. "The concept of legislative intent may be artificial, but it is also
indispensable. Besides the construct is not wholly arbitrary." S2 But he
does not want the actual, raw, confused goals that those who passed the
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id. at 7.
49. Bork, supra note 35, at 8.
50. It is interesting to compare Mr. Bork's current reverence for the original understanding of
the Constitution with his polite condescension towards the authors of the Robinson-Patman Act,
who "may well have been moved by an NRA-style philosophy" and an ignorance of economic
consequences. BORK, supra note 45, at 63.
51. Id. at 15.
52. Id. at 57.
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statutes either had, or were understood at the time to have had. What he
wants is a legislative intent purified and refined in the fires of modern
views about economy and society. "A legislature may never address the
issue of ultimate policy goals and yet write a law whose various categories and distinctions can be explained only by a particular policy. That
policy may then quite legitimately be said to have been intended by the
legislature, even though not a single member articulated it to himself. 53
From this "not wholly arbitrary" vision of legislative intent and a modem lawyer's vision of microeconomics, Mr. Bork can discern amoung the
many goals of the antitrust statutes "only one legitimate goal, and that
goal can be derived as rigorously as any theorem in economics."54 The
goal is "consumer welfare." It is fascinating to contrast Mr. Bork's
willingness to supplement the original intention or understanding of the
antitrust statutes with his advocacy of original understanding in constitutional interpretation. He speaks dismissively of the "primitive state of
the law's economic doctrines,,55 and moves quickly to deploy the weapons of modem economic analysis. Yet when contemporary legal scholars
take a similar approach to the Constitution, bringing to higher levels of
generality principles which have only "whatever credentials time alone
can confer," or which are thought to be morally reprehensible, Mr. Bork
considers it the worst kind of sacrilege.
It is no answer to say that antitrust law is merely statute law. Mr.
Bork explicitly argues that original understanding applies across the
board as a legal philosophy. Another possible response would be to
argue that the original understanding can be supplemented by developments in a supposedly value-free field such as economics, but not by
changes in moral attitudes. Even if we accepted the dubious epistemological premise, this would get Mr. Bork no further. Jim May has
demonstrated the impossibility of this position. 56 In fact, the authors of
the antitrust statutes had a perfectly coherent economic theory which
simply favored values different from those embodied in current theory.
The statutes and early cases rested not merely on "open-ended SUbjective
populism" but instead on the classical economics propounded by the
likes of Wayland and Bowen, and eagerly absorbed by a generation of
legislators and judges. 57 This vision gave rise to "analyses that, while
faithful to one generation's economic vision, could be found not only
53. [d.
54. [d. at 51.
55. [d. at 134.
56. See May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 496
(1986).
57. For a more general account of the impact of law on classical and neoclassical economic
thought, and of economics on law, see Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on
the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 939, 940-967 (1985); May, Antitrust in the
Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis 1880-1918, 50
OHIO ST. L.J. 258, 258-287 (1989).
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faulty, but practically unintelligible by a later generation of antitrust analysts influenced by a very different vision of the nature of economic
rea1ity.',s8
If one puts a multi-goal antitrust policy to the test of an economic
theory which postulates "consumer welfare" as the highest good, it will
fail. But what happens if, as the philosophy of original understanding
requires, we test it according to the values of the economic theory reigning at the time? Antitrust policy fares rather better by the lights of classical economic theory, which guards against the distortion of "natural
processes" and builds on the indissoluble connection between political
morality and economics. Even if original understanding does not force
us to look to the economic wisdom at the time the antitrust statutes were
written, Mr. Bork has no way of proving that his economics serves preferable values. Why is consumer welfare better than economic decentralization? "There is no way of deciding these matters other than by
reference to some system of moral or ethical values that has no objective
or intrinsic validity of its own and about which men can and do ditfer.',s9
Mr. Bork is caught once again in nets of his own devising.
IV.

THE FLIGHT FROM VALUE

The dilemma revealed in this last quotation is the beginning of the
Ariadne's thread which will lead us through the maze of Mr. Bork's
ideas. To some, the revelation that Mr. Bork has espoused so many different legal theories, and done so with such vigor, would suggest that he
is merely a conservative ideologist-for-hire, producing whatever legal
theory is necessary to win the political debates of the moment. Though I
deeply disagree with Mr. Bork about almost everything, I think this
would be unfair. I believe that Mr. Bork's long march through the halls
of conservative legal theory represents a sincere, almost anguished,
attempt to deal with a single dilemma: If there is no way of deciding
matters of legal interpretation except "by reference to some system of
moral or ethical values that has no objective or intrinsic validity of its
own," then what of the rule of law itself, or of the line between law and
politics?
In my view, this recurring concern is the most important recurring
theme in Mr. Bork's writings. (Although, as I will argue later, The
Tempting of America may mark a partial break with the rest of the
canon.) In Civil Rights-A Challenge, this concern led him to believe
that Congress had no business overpowering the value judgements of
racist hotel keepers with value judgements of its own. If value judgements are truly arbitrary, the law should carve out spheres of liberty in
58.
59.

May, supra note 56, at 593.
Dork, supra note 35, at 10.
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which people can decide for themselves. In The Supreme Court Needs a
New Philosophy, Mr. Bork's concern was expressed in terms ofa commitment to "process" rather than substantive (and arbitrary) value choice,
at least in those areas in which the political process functioned well.
Where it did not, Mr. Bork advocated a craftsmanlike derivation of new
"natural rights" underlying the liberties which must be protected from
majorities. Again, those liberties must be protected precisely so that a
minority could exercise its own arbitrary values in private, free from the
arbitrary value judgements of the majority. In his Neutral Principles
article, we see the same concern in a commitment to protecting only
those rights for which a Wechslerian "neutral principle" could be generated, and to letting the majority express its unreviewable value judgements everywhere.
In The Antitrust Paradox that concern leads Mr. Bork, as it has led a
good many conservatives recently, to reject the contentious and ideologically loaded choices he saw in the law and to embrace instead the scientific certainties apparently offered by microeconomic analysis.
Admittedly, Mr. Bork tells us that the microeconomic theory we need is
not to be confused with the contradictory theories actually produced by
economists. That belief is an understandable mistake of the lay mind.
"The layman is likely to think that economic theory is what any economist theorizes, but of course it is not. If it were, we should have to
believe that there are dozens or hundreds of mutually incompatible versions of economic theory, each as good as any other.,,60 That would be
intolerable because the point of this whole process was to introduce a
scientific and unchanging criterion, a goal of antitrust that "can be
derived as rigorously as any theorem in economics." There is no room
for the suggestion that economics itself might embody unexplained value
choices or be subject to internal professional dispute. Consequently, "the
judge, legislator or lawyer cannot simply take the word of an economist
in dealing with antitrust, for the economists will certainly disagree."61
When his quest for a constitutional interpretation free from value judgments leads him to seek a foundation in history rather than economics,
Mr. Bork will take a similarly dismissive view of the kind of history that
historians produce.
Here then, is the heart of Mr. Bork's intellectual mission-to offer a
convincing conservative answer to the central question of liberal society.
How can we run a society if value judgements are subjective and relative?
Each of his theories seems to offer the hope of answering this question,
but each eventually collapses, driving him to the next, "inescapable" set
of ideas. As a libertarian, he believed we could leave value judgements to
60.
61.

BoRK, supra note 45, at 117.
[d. at 118.
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individuals, but he encountered the difficulty of drawing the lines inside
which individuals could exercise their arbitrary values. As an advocate
of traditional judicial restraint, he believed that those choices could be
left to the political process, if they were first properly framed by the
court. Yet he doubted that the line between those issues that the court
must solve and those that it can leave to another institution could be
neatly drawn. When he came under the sway of Herbert Wechsler's theory, he accepted that courts might actually decide hard questions provided they used a principle which is "neutral" as to visions of the good.
When he wrote The Antitrust Paradox he believed that the value judgements expressed by the legislature could be purified by the scientific wisdom of economic analysis, and could thus provide legislative goals as
rigorously derived as any theorem of economics. His final turn has been
towards originalism, the theory he once scorned as naive. Originalism
"solves" the problem of value in constitutional theory by claiming that it
does no more than apply the Framers' value judgements, and that those
value judgements are actually historical facts, not values at all. Since
liberal epistemology accepts the possibility of rational discussion about
facts, the problem of value for constitutional theory is solved. Or is it?
V.

ORIGINAL INTENT

The better known variant of originalism, and the one that Mr. Bork
first adopted and held as recently as 1986, was the philosophy of original
intent. 62 The Constitution means what the Framers (or perhaps the
Framers and ratifiers) meant it to. This is the most influential version of
originalism, the judicial philosophy championed by recent Attorneys
General. While it may be most popular, it is also the easiest to blowout
of the water. Listing the arguments against it is the kind of arduous,
lengthy, and repetitive task which Victorians believed suitable for the
rehabilitation of convicts. I undertake it here in the hope of acquiring
virtue.
First, the idea that the intention of the original author must govern the
meaning of the text is simply false as both a practical and a philosophical
matter. In law and in life generally we use many different interpretive
criteria to establish what something "means." Second, it may well be
that the only true way to follow the intent of the Framers is by not following their intent. There'is strong historical evidence that the Framers
did not wish their intentions to bind future generations. Professor H.
Jefferson Powell has shown, in his article The Original Understanding of
62. See. e.g., Bork. The Constitution. Original Intent and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 823 (\ 986). "I wish to demonstrate that original intent is the only legitimate basis for
constitutional decision making." Id. "The only way that the Constitution can constrain judges is if
the judges interpret the document's words according to the intentions of those who drafted,
proposed, and ratified its provisions and various amendments." Id. at 826.

284

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

[Vol. 3: 263

Original Intent,63 that the Framers had a vision of interpretation governed by the traditional hermeneutic methods of the common law rather
than by the simple notion of original intent. Third, records we do have
of the Framers' intentions are often contradictory, indeterminate, or
both. Thus, the difficulty of reading the text of the Constitution is merely
shifted to reading the historical records. Fourth, in those few areas
where original intent is clear, it is sometimes morally outrageous. Any
protagonist of original intent must confront the dubious moral acceptability of allowing constitutional interpretation to be governed by the
beliefs of these men, many of whom believed ardently in slavery and the
innate inferiority of women. Fifth, the theory of original intent is inconsistent with most of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, with the vast
majority of scholarly writing, with the opinions of most constitutional
historians, and probably with the views of most Americans.
Finally, the adoption of original intent as a universal guiding principle
would entail an impossible transition from current constitutional
arrangements. As Mr. Bork once put it, "[t]his Nation has grown up in
ways that do not comport with the intentions of the people who wrote
the Constitution-the commerce clause is one exampl~and it is simply
too late to go back and tear that up. I cite to you the legal tender cases.
These are extreme examples admittedly. Scholarship suggests that the
Framers intended to prohibit paper money. Any judge who thought
today he would go back to the original intent really ought to be accompanied by a guardian rather than be sitting on a bench."64
VI.

ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING

With this range of defects it is hardly surprising that Mr. Bork chose
to shift his ground somewhat. In The Tempting of America he argues
that the understanding of the Constitution's contemporary audience,
rather than the intent of its original authors, should determine its meaning. This shift has its disadvantages. The best thing about the intent of
the Framers was that it appealed to the intuition that a document must
always mean exactly what its authors meant it to. The practitioners of
original intent can claim that their method is the one "natural" way to
read the text. They can even claim that we often read other legal documents this way-that we try to determine what Congress, or the judge,
98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). For the subsequent controversy see also L. LEVY, ORIGINAL
AND THE FRAMER'S CoNSTITUTION (1988); Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of
Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (1987); Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical
Perspective. 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 296 (1986); Presser, The Original Misunderstanding: The
English. The Americans, And The Dialectic of Federalist Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 Nw. U.L.
REV. 106 (1990).
64. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, l00th Cong., 1st Sess. 84-85 (1987)
[hereinafter Hearings].
63.

INTENT
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or the administrator meant by a particular word or phrase. Original
understanding has less intuitive appeal. Precisely because it is a more
sophisticated notion of interpretation, originalism sacrifices the notion
that there is only one credible way to read a text. The shift also diminishes the appeal to common experience and the parallel to reading other
legal texts.
This problem is a particularly acute one for Mr. Bork. Throughout
The Tempting Of America he explicitly connects his struggles to those
going on within other disciplines. Most disciplines seem to have rejected
the idea that the text can be read to mean only what the author intended.
Literary critics and historians have acknowledged other accounts of
reading, which abandon author-centricity to focus on context and the
text's reception by the reader. These other methods are known generally
as "the reader's revolution against the author." They represent everything that Mr. Bork finds most reprehensible in today's scholarship. He
quotes approvingly a letter from intellectual historian Gertrude Himmelfarb attacking this openness to other methods of interpretation. "Any
methodology becomes permissible (except of course, the traditional one),
and any reading of the texts becomes legitimate (except, of course, that of
the author)" (p. 137). Professor Himmelfarb's objection would be compatible with a doctrine of original intent. But Mr. Bork's new version of
originalism can no longer appeal to the romantic idea that the imperial
will of the author must govern the text. "The search is not for a subjective intention" (p. 144). Instead, he lodges interpretive competence in
the historically-located readers of the constitution. He has merely shifted
ultimate interpretive authority from the Framers of the Constitution to
the "public of that time." Mr. Bork has joined the reader's revolution.
As I pointed out before, this switch is a costly one for Mr. Bork. To
the initial cost of being seen to adopt the very same methodology
criticised by conservatives in other academic disciplines, one has to add
the cost of being seen to change from one dogmatically asserted position
to another. Mr. Bork obviously feels this one particularly strongly
because he denies having done it. Though he described himself during
the hearings as "a judge with an original intent philosophy,,6S and argued
in print that "original intent is the only legitimate basis for constitutional
decision-making,"66 he says in The Tempting of America that "[n]o even
moderately sophisticated originalist" believes the Constitution should be
governed by "the subjective intent of the Framers" (p. 218). He suggests
that no-one could ever have held such a belief, because it would necessarily mean that the secretly held beliefs of the Framers could change the

65.
66.

Hearings, Part 1 at 159 (1987).
Bork, supra note 63, at 823.
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meaning of the document. Thus all moderately sophisticated originalists
must have believed in original understanding all along.
This is a red herring. There are many varieties of intentionalism and
many varieties of "reader-controlled" interpretation. But allowing the
intention of the author to control interpretation is fairly obviously not
the same thing as allowing the understanding of the reader to control.
Expanding the definition of intentionalism does not tum it into the philosophy of original understanding. The "intention of the Framers and
ratifiers" is not the same as "the understanding of the American people
at the time." Mr. Bork seems to find it hard to admit the change.
The most interesting example of Mr. Bork's scholarly method is his
use in The Tempting of America of sections of his 1986 article The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights. 67 As one might suspect
from the title, that article defends original intent. But in The Tempting
of America, Mr. Bork uses those sections to defend original understanding. At first glance, it appears that he does this by finding the words
"original intent" wherever they appear in the article, and replacing them
with "original understanding." Passages in the article originally
reproved Paul Brest for failing to understand that the original intent
determines the meaning of the fourteenth Amendment. In the book
these passages are edited and expanded upon, and a new philosophy of
interpretation is inserted. With a quick change of key words they
become criticisms of Brest's failure to understand that the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment is determined by original understanding. 68
Even the same counterarguments can be pressed into service. In 1986
for example, he writes that "[t]here is one objection to intentionalism
that is particularly tiresome. Whenever I speak on the subject someone
invariably asks: "But why should we be ruled by men long dead?"69 In
1990, Mr. Bork tells us that "[q]uite often, when I speak at a law school
on the necessity of adhering to the original understanding, a student will
ask, "But why should we be ruled by men who are long dead?" (p. 170).
In the era of the word processor, this kind of "search and replace" jurisprudence has its attractions. Still, both the interpretive criteria and the
identity of the "dead men" has changed, and Mr. Bork seems uneasy
with that fact. 70
The closest Mr. Bork comes to admitting a prior attachment to intentionalism is his confession to having previously "written of the under67. Id.
68. Compare id. at 827-828 with The Tempting of America, at 148-9.
69. Id. at 827.
70. Searching for other possible interpretations, I wondered if Mr. Bork thinks original intent
and original understanding are the same. In that case, why change his terms and say they are
different? If on the other hand, they are not the same, why not admit he has changed his views and
explain how he came to believe first that original intent was only permissible judicial philosophy (Id
at 826, 832) and then that original understanding was the only permissible judicial philosophy? (pp.
9, 146 passim).
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standing ofthe ratifiers of the Constitution" (p. 144). Actually, he wrote
of the intentions of the ratifiers, and a more characteristic statement from
his earlier self would be "I wish to demonstrate that original intent is the
only legitimate basis for constitutional decision-making.,,71 This seems
definite enough, but the new Mr. Bork does not like it. Having deemphasised intention, and converted Framers to ratifiers, he then claims
that he was merely using "a shorthand formulation, because what the
ratifiers understood themselves to be enacting must be taken to be what
the public of that time would have understood the words to mean" (p.
144).72
VIII.

PROBLEMS WITH ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING

So Mr. Bork pays a high price for his move from original intent to
original understanding. Is the game worth the candle? Does he succeed
in escaping the devastating criticism of original intent which apparently
prompted originalists to switch their ground in the first place? Sadly for
him, the answer is no. In fact, a little reflection will reveal that the philosophy of original understanding is beset by exactly the same problems
as the philosophy of original intent and has less intuitive appeal, to boot.
Surprisingly, the implications of the choice between original understanding and original intent have received only occasional attention inside the
originalist movement73 and little attention outside. 74
71. [d. at 823.
72. Of course, according to his new theory, what Mr. Bork meant by his "shorthand tenns" is
irrelevant, the important thing is what he would be understood to mean when he said "original
intent." Perhaps he feels his new method should not apply here. Yet Mr. Bork is stem in pointing
out that lawmakers could not use the doctrine of subjective intention to weasel out of something they
had said. "If Congress enacted a statute outlawing the sale of automatic rifles and did so in the
Senate by a vote of 51 to 49, no court would overturn a conviction because two Senators in the
majority testified that they had really intended only to prohibit the use of such rifles. They said
"sale" and "sale" it is. Thus, the common objection to the philosophy of original understandingthat Madison kept his notes of the convention at Philadelphia secret for many years-is off the mark.
He knew that what mattered was public understanding, not subjective intentions" (p. 144). One
might imagine that the public understanding of "original intent" would be "original intent."
73. The defense of the philosophy of original understanding, that seems to have convinced Mr.
Bork is Professor Henry Monaghan's Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 CoLUM. L.
REV. 723 (1988). Professor Monaghan implicitly reproves those who put forward "intentionalist"
versions of originalismfor providing "an easy mark for critics of originalism." [d. at 725. His
example of an intentionalist who "apparently" holds such as position is R. BERGER, FEDERALISM:
THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987). [d. at n.8. Professor Monaghan is "forced to conclude that
original understanding must give way in the face of transfonnative or longstanding precedent, a
conclusion that in tum may make inevitable the unsettling acknowledgement that originalism and
stare decisis themselves are but two among several means of maintaining political stability and
continuity in society." [d. at 724. This conclusion is markedly more consistent with the Burkean
vision of Mr. Bork's views which I present in Section VIII, than with the attempt to "reason without
prejudice" towards an abstract and neutral theory of constitutional law. The appearance of
Professor Monaghan's article in 1988 may explain the sudden, complete, and unacknowledged
reversal of Mr. Bork's opinions about original intent between 1986 and 1990.
74. In fact, a number of those commenting on The Tempting of America do not appear to be
aware that Mr. Bork has changed his position from "intent" to "understanding." See e.g., Eric
Foner's otherwise excellent review, Bork's notion offramers' 'original intent' smells like bigframeup,
IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 14-20, 1990, at 18. Despite the title of his article, The Original
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The first problem facing original intent was that it could not claim to
be the only authoritative way to read a text. Shifting the focus from
author's intentions to reader's interpretation lends nothing to the claim
to the unique correctness of a method of interpretation.
The second problem facing original intent was the considerable evidence that the Framers themselves intended that their intent should not
govern future interpretation. Professor H. Jefferson Powell makes this
point in The Original Understanding of Original Intent,75 an article cited
by every work on orignal intent, with the notable exception of Mr.
Bork's. Professor Powell shows that the Framers had a vision of interpretation guided more by the traditional hermeneutic methods of the
common law than by the simple notion of original intent. If one had to
pick a single motive that prompted originalists to switch their attentions
from intent to understanding, it would probably be the difficulty of dealing with this discovery. However, original understanding fares little better among the Framers, as this quotation from Alexander Hamilton
might indicate:
The Secretary of State will not deny, that whatever may have been
the intention of the framers of a constitution, or of a law, that intention is to be sought for in the instrument itself, according to the
usual & established rules of construction. Nothing is more common
than for laws to express and effect, more or less than was intended.
If then a power to erect a corporation, in any case, be deducible by
fair inference from the whole or any part of the numerous provisions
of the constitution of the United States, arguments drawn from
extrinsic circumstances, regarding the intention of the convention,
must be rejected. 76
Laws can express or effect more than was intended, or for that matter,
understood. In such a case, the true guide is the "usual and established
Misunderstanding, Stephen Presser seems to hold the same opinion. "Judge Bork is a well-known
'intentionalist,' a scholar who believes that it is appropriate and desirable for modern constitutional
interpreters to try to understand the aims of those who framed the 1787 document and to implement
the framer's intent." Presser, The Original Misunderstanding, 84 Nw. U.L. REv. 106 (1990).
Admittedly, as will be seen later, Mr. Bork's position is not always either clear or consistent. He
sometimes seems to be assuming that the audience at the time would understand the Constitution to
mean what they assumed the Framers intended it to mean, thus merging the two positions. Leaving
aside the circular problems of this argument, it is in fact unlikely that a contemporary legally trained
reader would have "understood" any such thing. For a definitive and whimsical study of the
methodological difficulties involved in both versions of originalism, see Bittker, The Bicentennial of
the Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 235 (1989).
75. 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). For the subsequent controversy see also L. LEVY, ORIGINAL
INTENT AND THE FRAMER'S CONSTITUTION (1988); POWELL, The Modern Misunderstanding of
Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (1987); Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical
Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296 (1986); Presser, The Original Misunderstanding: The
English, The Americans, And The Dialectic of Federalist Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 Nw. L.
REV. 106 (1990).
76. Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (1791) reprinted in
8 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97-111, at 103 (H. Syrett ed. 1965).
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rules of construction," which at the time certainly did not mean Mr.
Bork's theory of original understanding.
The third problem with original intent was its failure as a corrective
for indeterminacy. Here too the shift represents no improvement. When
one switches from the indeterminate intentions of a group of authors to
the indeterminate understandings of an indeterminate group of readers,
the problem is hardly solved. The historical methods used to work out
the understanding of the public will differ from those used to work out
the intention of the framers. Should we follow William Crosskey and
develop a "dictionary of the eighteenth century word usages, and political and legal ideas, which are needed for a true understanding of the
Constitution"?77 Should we parse the Federalist Papers, the hermeneutic
conventions of eighteenth century common lawyers, or the propaganda
pamphlets and broadsheets which the average voter might have considered? Even if we could agree that understanding rather than intent
should govern, how do we decide whose understanding is relevant? Is it
that of the delegates to the conventions? The ratifiers? The people who
elected the ratifiers? An average member of the legal profession? Of the
public? Should we include the disenfranchised, or is this to be an entirely
white male original understanding? Even if we could agree on the correct
group, the evidence we have of opinions within such groups indicates
that their "understanding" diverged markedly depending on class, political affiliation, professional status, and geographical location. 78
The fourth problem was that in those few cases where we can discern
the original intent, it often turns out to be morally objectionable. The
same problem afRicts the theory of original understanding. Franchised
American society was overwhelmingly a privileged white male group.
The opinions of a majority of that group strike us today as sexist, racist,
classist, and heavily elitist. Do we want the understanding of these people to govern us?
The final problem with original intent was that it flew in the face of
two hundred years of Supreme Court jurisprudence and both scholarly
and popular opinion. Again, original understanding fares no better.
Like original intent, original understanding is a philosophically flawed,
historically unsupported method of interpretation which is often practi77. w. CROSSKEY, POLmcs AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1172-73 (1953).
78. See. e.g.• 1 P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (1987). After

promising a 5 volume" 'original understanding' of those who agitated for, proposed, argued over
and ultimately voted for or against the Constitution of 1787," id. at xi, the authors had this to say
about the determinacy of the their findings. "We are loath to dangle before the reader yet another
promise that the crooked will be made straight and the rough places plain; we promise, rather,
complexity and complication." In my favorite article on originalism, Boris Bittker quoted the same
passage and then, speaking through the mouth of a fictional character, described the founder's intent
as "a well stocked pantry waiting for an imaginative chef." Bittker, supra note 74, at 251.
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cally indeterminate, sometimes morally objectionable, and generally at
odds with practice and scholarship.
How does Mr. Bork deal with these apparently serious problems? In
particular, how does he deal with the very real historical challenges to
the validity, workability, and moral acceptability of his method? The
Tempting of America offers no answer to these historical objections, and
little in the way of history itself. Mr. Bork quotes a few passages from
letters or cases, but never engages in the very practice of historical exegesis of the constitution which he would require of judges. The only sustained historical work in the book is a history of Mr. Bork's favorite and
least favorite Supreme Court cases. Since his project is to advocate a
method based on historical analysis, it may be useful to look closely at
the one piece of history he offers.

IX.

MR. BORK'S HISTORY

No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or
feeling ... should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction . . . than they were intended to
bear when the instrument was framed and adopted .... If any of its
provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the
instrument itself by which it may be amended: but while it remains
unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time
of its adoption.
This passage is not taken from The Tempting of America, though it
would certainly not be out of place in that book. Nor is it taken from a
speech given by a Reagan or Bush appointee to the Justice Department,
though it bears all the hallmarks of such a document. The quotation
comes, in fact, from a Supreme Court case. Here is a neat and thoroughly authoritative judicial statement of the philosophy of original
understanding. As such, one might imagine that it finds great favor with
Mr. Bork. Not so. This is a quotation from Dred Scott v. Sandford,79
probably the most infamous case ever decided by the Supreme Court and
the one most universally reviled by generations of law professors.
This quotation is not an isolated instance. Rather, a large portion of
Justice Taney's opinion is given over to the original understanding of the
Constitution on the matter of slavery. Justice Taney not only searches
for the original understanding of the Constitution, he uses it to interpret
the Declaration of Independence. Could the slaveowners who wrote and
ratified that document really have intended that "all men" mean al/
men? Justice Taney uses original understanding to decode the meaning
of these apparently general words.
79.

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,426 (1857) (emphasis added).

1991]

Boyle

291

The language of the Declaration of Independence is equally conclusive.... The general words ... would seem to embrace the whole
human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this
day would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the
enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed
no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration; for if
the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the
conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of
Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent
with the principles they asserted; and instead of the sympathy of
mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would have
deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation. 80
Some of the Founders of the Republic were slaveowners. So were
many of the citizens. Since they cannot be presumed to be hypocrites,
and since their understanding of the document-not the meaning that
the words have come to acquire--is dispositive, there can be no doubt on
the matter. Slaves have no share of the rights claimed by the Declaration
of Independence.
Given these methodological premises, how can we doubt that Dred
Scott will lose? Changing sentiment or moral outrage are irrelevant.
Here is the unedited version of the quotation:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or
feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of
Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give to the
words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor
than they were intended to bear when the instrument was framed
and adopted. 81
Justice Taney, like Mr. Bork, knows that his conception of the judicial
role is the correct one. Justice Taney, like Mr. Bork, has in his hands a
timeless document.
It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and dele-

gates the same powers to the Government, and reserves and secures
the same rights and privileges to the citizen; and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words,
but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it
came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted
by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction
would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the
mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day. This court
was not created by the Constitution for such purposes. Higher and
graver trusts have been confided to it, and it must not falter from the
80.
81.

[d. at 409-10.
[d. at 426.
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path of duty. 82
Does Dred Scott discredit the philosophy of original understanding?
Obviously, it is disconcerting to find one's philosophy serving as the cornerstone of the most reviled case in the history of the United States
Supreme Court. It is more than disconcerting to find that original understanding seems to write Blacks out of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. Still, one might argue that even a good method
can produce bad results. Is that Mr. Bork's response? Not exactly.
Mr. Bork does feature Dred Scott in his capsule history of the Court.
He also agrees that the case is a bad one-"[s]peaking only of the constitutional legitimacy of the decision, and not of its morality, this case
remained unchallenged as the worst in our history until the twentieth
century provided rivals for that title" (p. 28). How does Mr. Bork deals
with this taint on the escutcheon of original understanding? Well, by
ignoring it, mostly.
The case takes up 241 pages in the Reports. There is no need to
examine all of its dubious arguments; it was quite evident not only
that Scott was to remain a slave but that Justice Taney intended to
read into the Constitution the legality of slavery forever" (p. 30).
Having decided that there is "no need to examine" Justice Taney's
"dubious arguments," many of which were appeals to original understanding, Mr. Bork concludes that the real evil in Taney's opinion is that
it introduces the concept of substantive due process. He describes this
concept as one "that has been used countless times since by judges who
want to write their personal beliefs into a document that, most inconveniently, does not contain those beliefs" (p. 31). With this breathtakingly
simple move, Mr. Bork himself is able to ignore the inconvenient parts of
Taney's opinion, to concentrate solely on Taney's "introduction" of substantive due process. Mr. Bork considers substantive due process one of
the most appalling features of contemporary liberal jurisprudence. The
message is clear. This is "the worst constitutional decision of the nineteenth century" (p. 28), and it is the ancestor of contemporary liberal
constitutional interpretation. Can the fruit fall far from the tree?
As if this were not enough, Mr. Bork then turns round and concludes
that the judicial hero of Dred Scott, Justice Benjamin Curtis, author of
the dissent, was the real proponent of originalism in this case. He
achieves this by using quotations from the dissent which will not bear the
meaning he assigns them, while ignoring the explicit defense of original
understanding in the majority opinion. From Mr. Bork such scholarship
is more disappointing than it would be from most scholars. Mr. Bork's
constitutional philosophy relies on the historical record as a check against
82.

[d.
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judicial activism. Yet, with "history" like this, what could not be
proved? Let us be charitable and assume that he did not have the opportunity to read the case before writing about it. How might he deal with
what Taney's opinion really says?
Mr. Bork could account for the majority opinion in Dred Scott in one
of two ways. First, he could say that his method can be convincingly
manipulated to reach bad results. This response, however, tends to
undermine his claim that reliance on original understanding constrains
judicial behavior. Second, he might say that the method was correctly
used but that it produces repugnant results in this case because the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution were racists. This raises the more
fundamental question of morality. Taney argues with some force that
the historical record shows that, at the time of the writing of the Constitution, the "unfortunate" Negro race was thought of as almost a different
species. This view, to say nothing of views about women or the working
class, are part of both the intention of the Framers and the understanding
of franchised citizens at the time. Can we accept as an interpretive guide
to the Constitution the understanding of a group of men whose views
were sometimes so abhorrent? Mr. Bork might try to answer these objections by pointing out that there were also abolitionists and radical republicans at the Philadelphia Convention, among the ratifiers of the
Constitution, and scattered through the general voting population. But
that observation undermines the notion of a single "original
understanding. "
Mr. Bork's actual response seems to be that the morally abhorrent
views of the Framers have since been purged from the Constitution by
the fourteenth and nineteenth amendments. This is a particularly weak
argument, in a book not unduly burdened by strong ones. Imagine for a
moment that Mr. Bork can identify some coherent group whose understanding of the Constitution is clear and consistent and whose views
ought to bind us. Does he think that the moral views of that group were
not part of a system but rather a random collection of separate, independent elements? Can we discard racism and misogyny, keeping the rest
intact? If you believed women, Blacks and the working class to be inferior and fundamentally untrustworthy, your ideas about the necessary
structure of society and the division of powers between the organs of
government would obviously be different from those of someone working
from more egalitarian and democratic assumptions. It is a strange world
Mr. Bork lives in, if he thinks a person's deepest moral views have no
connection to each other, no implications for their other ideas. But then
again, Mr. Bork does live in a strange world. His unusual combination of
authoritarian constitutional interpretation and moral skepticism probably does allow him to believe that moral values have no connection to
each other.
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The liberal response to the problem of eighteenth-century bigotry is to
say that we should not be faithful to the Framers' intentions, or to the
understanding of those who ratified the Constitution, but instead to a
generalized and coherent version of the moral system they articulated.
When the authors of the Declaration of Independence say "all men,"
meaning and being understood to mean only white men, we should
abstract the universal principle from its rough and irrationally biased historical origins. Purified in the fires of Kantian moral theory it will give
us the non-racial, sexually equal democracy we (in the insidious knowledge class) have always wanted. This answer will not save Mr. Bork's
project. In fact, it is what he fears most. 83
Having examined every possible avenue of escape for Mr. Bork, we can
see why he finds "no need" to trace out Taney's "dubious arguments."
Those arguments are his own, and they lead him where he does not want
to go.

IX.

Is

BORK A BURKEAN?

At the beginning of this essay, I argued that it would be a mistake to
dismiss Mr. Bork's work too easily. It is true that its philosophical and
historical errors, confused argumentation and sloppy research84 make it a
particularly easy target for the reviewer's barbs. Nevertheless, to dismiss
it with a facile (or even a contemptuously patronizing) account of its
manifold contradictions is to leave a number of important questions
unanswered. If the arguments in this book are really so weak, why does
one get the sense while reading it that it taps some deep wellspring of
discontent with the discourse of liberal politics and academia? Put
another way, if this book-praised to the heavens by the conservative
political pundits featured on the book jacket-seems to liberals to be just
so much dross and bluster, is one side being deceitful, or is there is a
fundamental breakdown of communication between the two sides?
I would like to suggest that The Tempting of America is, in fact, a
schizophrenic work. On one hand, it attempts to justify the theory of
83. Mr. Bork explicitly rejects such a process. "The role of a judge committed to the philosophy
of original understanding is not to 'choose a level of abstraction.' Rather it is to find the meaning of
the text-a process which includes finding its degree of generality which is part of its meaning ... "
(p. 149). That meaning, of course, can only come from text and original understanding, not from
Kantian moral theory. Mr. Bork has been strongly criticized by liberal legal theorists, particularly
by Ronald Dworkin, for his failure to "purify" the original understanding by raising it to a higher
level of generality. Ironically, the method Dworkin espouses is exactly the method Mr. Bork himself
advocated in his writings in the late sixties and early seventies, though Kant seems to have whispered
different results into their respective ears.
84. Sloppy research seems the most charitable explanation for Mr. Bork's treatment of Dred
Scott. Other parts of the book show that the pressure of timely publication may have worked its
subtle magic on Mr. Bork's table of authorities. Admittedly, the relatively indiscriminate citation
which results has its own charming compensations. Senator Edward Kennedy and Professor
Duncan Kennedy will no doubt both be dismayed to find that the index has amalgamated them into
a single person with an impressive, if varied, list of publications (p. 412).
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original understanding within the epistemological framework of liberal
rationalism, while on the other it presents a basic challenge to that entire
framework. To be sure, the challenge is not a systematic one. To be
sure, it wa.o; made (and made better) over two hundred years ago by
Edmund Burke. To be sure, Mr. Bork does not himself distinguish the
occasions on which he is working within the canon of liberal thought
from the occasions when he is challenging it. But there is a challenge
here, nonetheless: a challenge to such foundations of liberal rationalism
as the idea that no one has a privileged insight into the moral universe, or
that the only social institutions worth keeping are those which pass test
of reason. In fact, there is a challenge to the possibility of comprehending the social world at all through the reliance on only "the fallible
and feeble contrivances of our reason. ,,8S
Seen in this light, this book may mark a departure for Mr. Bork. For
the ·first time, he seems to question the centrality of the problem of value,
the problem which has animated all of his previous conservative incarnations. Each of the theories he has espoused promised to solve, or at least
salve, the problem that, in a liberal society, values are presumed to be
subjective and arbitrary and the state is supposed to embody no particular conception of the good. Some of the theories offered a neutral
method (economic analysis, neutral principles), while others claimed to
have identified the right parties whose values should govern (libertarianism, process theory, and original intent). All assume that the SUbjectivity
of values is the problem to be solved and that reason is the tool to solve
it. It is my claim that, at certain places in his most recent work, Mr.
Bork moves away from both of those assumptions. To explain how he
does so, I must first set the stage.
So far in this article I have concentrated on those places where Mr.
Bork has tried and failed to fit his ideas into the analytical framework
provided by liberal rationalism. In this section I will focus on the other
strand of his ideas. In order to do so, I will compare Mr. Bork's ideas to
those of those of the great 18th century conservative, Edmund Burke.
Burke wrote at the dawn of "the age of reason," while Bork writes in
what is supposed to be its twilight. The surprising similarities in their
ideas may explain the attractiveness of Mr. Bork's work despite its analytical flaws. At the same time, it may illuminate the condition of late
twentieth century conservative thought. To bring out this other side of
Mr. Bork's work, it is necessary to return to those parts of his argument
which seem most dogmatic and contradictory-in particular, his attempt
to have his philosophy of interpretation imposed as a prerequisite to judicial confirmation, and his account of the legitimacy of "moral
legislation. "
85.

E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 121 (C.C. O'Brien ed. 1968).
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Mr. Bork believes that to require judicial candidates to adhere to one
interpretive method would be a contentious, political, and therefore a
bad decision. We could not insist, for example, that candidates for the
Supreme Court promise to consider only the face value of the words of
the Constitution. Nor could we insist that judges swear that they would
interpret the Constitution's provisions in the light of changing moral sentiment, economic efficiency, technological progress, or democratic values. To impose any of these interpretive methods would be "political."
But he does not consider it "political" to insist, as a precondition for
their confirmation, that judges swear loyalty to the method of original
intent. It is not political, it seems, because that method is right.
This confident willingness to dictate a method to those with different
views is hard to reconcile with relativism and the idea that values are
subjective. After all, one premise of the liberal state is that no one has a
privileged insight into the moral or philosophical universe. 86 No one can
use a claim to moral truth to get the state to enforce his views on
others. 87
Mr. Bork's attempt to justify his dogmatism within the strictures of
liberal rationalism results in the knotty difficulties described in the first
part of this essay. He claims that his current method of interpretation is
not one among competing methods, but is instead the only way to read a
legal text properly. He claims that it is neutral in derivation and application, and not a set of value judgements. If value judgements are being
imposed, they are those of the Framers and ratifiers. He claims that his
method is well-founded historically, and that we would have to invent it
if it were not. He claims so many things, and so unconvincingly, that one
is driven to wonder if he cares about this side of his argument. These
difficulties would all disappear if Mr. Bork decided explicitly to reject the
premises of liberalism. It would be stretching the point to say that Mr.
Bork does in fact make a frontal attack on these premises. But for every
time that he accepts them, there is another moment when he challenges
them. His discussion of morals provides a particularly good example.
At first, Mr. Bork comes across as entirely conventional in his premises, if not his conclusions, about moral argument. Like the sexually
86. Hence liberals argue that decisions about value should be solved by the aggregation of
individual subjective choices. The democracy adds up our individual subjective values as expressed
by votes, and the market adds up our individual subjective values as expressed by the dollars we
spend. Mr. Bork appeals powerfully to this tradition when he claims that the effect of knowledge
class's attack on original intent has been to take value judgements away from the legislatures. After
all, questions on which reasonable people can disagree should properly be decided by democratically
elected representatives, because judges do not have a superior insight into the moral or philosophical
universe. U nelected judges should not impose their subjective views on others. Yet, to get to this
point, he must argue that originalism is both correct and a-political. Surely this implies that some
(unelected) people, Mr. Bork among them, do have a superior insight into the philosophical
universe-and are not at all chary about imposing their correct insight on others.
87. This, of course, is exactly Mr. Bork's criticism of the liberal jurisprudes and judges.
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active, egalitarian members of the knowledge class, Mr. Bork often
sounds like a social rationalist and a moral relativist. Scattered throughout The Tempting of America are discussions apparently based on the
idea that moral values (but not interpretive methods) are subjective, relative, and not subject to rational discussion. It is for exactly this reason
that he believes that some of the issues beloved of liberal constitutionalists should be decided by legislatures rather than courts. Courts have no
business deciding questions of value, where one person's opinion is as
good as another's. In these cases the majority decision is the only valid
one.
This opinion recurs frequently, as, for example, in his discussion of the
death penalty. He says of that debate, for example, "[i]t does no good to
dress the issue up as one of moral philosophy, because such philosophy
does not give a clear answer. Arguments have been made both ways and
none is conclusive" (p. 214). Mr. Bork does not think much of contemporary academic forays into moral philosophy. He points out that "[i]f
the greatest minds in our culture have not succeeded in devising a moral
system to which all intellectually honest persons must subscribe, it seems
doubtful, to say the least, that some law professor will make the breakthrough any time soon" (p. 255). Who can disagree? He announces that
he has made a decision, already evidenced by his presentation of opposing arguments, to give up reading legal scholarship of this type. "There
comes a time to stop visiting inventor's garages to see if someone really
has created a perpetual motion machine" (p. 255). Who can fail to sympathize? Mr. Bork even agrees with Alisdair MacIntyre that "[t]here
seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture. "88 Again, these seem like the words of a moral relativist.
In his argument for "legislated morality," however, Bork's views
become more complicated. He still seems to believe that moral decisions
are not subject to proof or refutation and therefore are unreviewable by
the analytic techniques of judicial reason. Thus they must be left to the
democratic legislature and the majority view. Although this certainly
seems like moral relativism, Mr. Bork reserves the term "relativist" for
those who disagree with him about the propriety of "legislated morality."
Liberals assume that if morals are SUbjective and relative, the state
should not be allowed to legislate morality for its citizens. Mr. Bork
draws rather different conclusions.
There being nothing in the Constitution prohibiting legislated
morality, the only opposition to it rests upon a moral view. The
Bowers dissent said as much when it stated as a "moral fact" that a
person belongs to himself and not to others or to society. Moral
relativism is, after all, one moral position. But the imposition of
88.

A. MACINTYRE. AfTER VIRTUE 6 (2d ed. 1984). quoted in Bork at 256.
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moral relativism upon legislatures by judges is not, strictly speaking,
moral relativism in itself. It is more accurately described as the
belief that the only valid and trustworthy morality is the judges'. (p.
126)
The key to this argument is the way it deprives moral relativism of universal status. By characterizing relativism as just one particular moral
system, rather than as universal claim about all moral systems, Mr. Bork
is able to tum the tables rather neatly. To say that we cannot legislate
morality would be to impose a moral view-moral relativism-something which moral relativism itself should prohibit. Legislated morality
cannot be reviewed, precisely because it is morality. The judge's opinion
is of no more weight than anyone else's. Very well, then. How do we
know when something is a moral issue? The answer to that question
turns out to be a little more complicated.
Discussing the application of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of'
equal protection to laws which make distinctions on the basis of gender
or sexual orientation, Mr. Bork makes two interesting pronouncements.
The first is about gender. "The general language of the clause, however,
continues to subject such cases to the test of whether statutory distinctions are reasonable. Sexual differences obviously make some distinctions reasonable while others have no apparent basis" (p. 150). Now, it
might appear unreasonable to ban homosexuals from military service
without proof that letting them serve would have negative effects. It
might appear unreasonable to criminalize a particular sexual practice
between consenting adults in their own home simply because some people don't like the idea of it. Mr. Bork does not find it so. "Society'S
treatment of sexual orientation is based upon moral perceptions, so that it
would be difficult to say that the various moral balances struck are
unreasonable" (p. 150, emphasis added).
The boundaries shift in this argument. Disparate treatment of women
can only be allowed if the distinction is reasonably based on (presumably
physical) sexual differences. Mere opinion or prejUdice is not enough.
Disparate treatment of gays, however, is "based on moral perceptions"
and therefore "it would be difficult to say" that they were "unreasonable." He restates this theme in more uncompromising tones in his discussion of Bowers v. Hardwick. 89 "[T]he suit was surely brought to seek
a declaration that would equate the constitutionality, and hence the presumed morality, of homosexual and heterosexual conduct. Hardwick's
suit, in a word, rested upon nothing in the Constitution and so was one
more sortie in our cultural war" (p. 117).
How does Mr. Bork know that discrimination against gays is a matter
of unreviewable and a-rational morality, while any discrimination against
89.

478

u.s.

186.
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women must undergo judicial scrutiny for reasonableness? Those who
believe that a woman's place is in the home argue that any other state of
affairs is unnatural and immoral. How does Mr. Bork determine what
constitutes a legitimately moral issue as opposed to merely an irrational
prejudice? The answer, I think, is that an issue is a "moral" one if it has
been traditionally seen as one by the majority of people in the society. I
can see no other distinction which will allow Mr. Bork to call discrimination against gays, but not against women, a matter of "morality."90
Mr. Bork's constitutional philosophy is not as changeless and neutral
as he pretends. He rails against liberals for modifying the constitution
according to changing moral sentiments, yet his interpretive method will
produce different results when sentiments change about which issues
count as moral ones. Mr. Bork appears as blind to this contradiction as
he was to the one between his complaint about the political litmus test
applied in his confirmation hearings and his own advocacy of such a test.
These contradictions lead us back to the possible challenge to Enlightenment premises hinted at in Bork's theory. I started this section pointing out that Mr. Bork often strays far from the two core premises of postEnlightenment liberal thought about social institutions. The first premise is that social institutions should be held up to the test of reason, and
those that cannot be rationally justified should perish. The second is that
morals are subjective and relative and not subject to rational proof. 91
From the second premise, or sometimes from the conjunction of both
premises, we derive this corollary: since no one has a privileged insight
into the moral universe, the state should be neutral among conceptions of
the good. In his discussion of sex discrimination, homosexuality, moral
legislation, and judicial method, Mr. Bork oscillates between criticizing
and relying on these liberal premises. He talks like a relativist one
moment, and then like one possessed of The Truth. He criticizes liberals
for imposing their ideas of judicial method and then argues that his own
should be imposed. He takes the liberal premise about relative values
and draws from it the conclusion that the judges cannot force the state to
·be neutral among conceptions of the good, because that would be the
90. And even there, I suspect he might be wrong given the traditional "moral" justifications of
sexism.
91. The contradiction between these two premises frames the most common source of critiques
of liberalism. For two very different such critiques see R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS
(1975) ("The characteristic predicament of the modem lawyer is to argue constantly about policy, as
if rational choice among competing values were possible, yet to remain faithful to the idea that
values are subjective and to the political doctrine of which that idea is apart.") and Arrow's
Impossibility Theorem (There are four minimum, but mutually exclusive, conditions which would
have to be satisfied for social choice accurately to reflect popular preferences. Social choices would
have to be transitive, free, and based on "endogenous" preferences. It must also be free from an
inverse relationship between the popularity of a choice and society's tolerance of it. According to
Arrow, all four conditions cannot be satisfied at once.) For problems in the conceptualization of
"choice" in models relying on an Arrovian vision see Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REv.
769; A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY (1987).
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imposition of a particular conception of the good. He tells judges that
they should wear their critical rationalist hats in reviewing laws which
burden women, but their deferential relativist hats when they are reviewing laws burdening homosexuals.
Mr. Bork is at his strongest in his fragmentary critiques92 of rationalism and relativism, so it is these that I propose to develop. I do so partly
because I am aware of the place of such a critique in the heritage of
conservative thought. There is a noble tradition of conservative attacks
on rationalism, relativism, and the other bulwarks of liberalism.
Edmund Burke mounted exactly such an attack. Burke's scattered topical writings resist summary, but his fundamental criticism was of the
hubris involved in supposedly rational criticisms of social institutions.
Scornful of the dogma that all values are relative, Burke argued that all
worthwhile values come from the often unreflective acceptance of a society's traditions. The most telling theme of Burke's writings is his defense
of this unreflective acceptance, which he defiantly called "prejudice,"
against the illusion of reason.
Burke argued against the rational reform of social institutions by
pointing out that the human ability to foresee was finite, whereas the
tests to which existing social institutions were subjected were infinite.
We should not abandon an institution simply because it is susceptible to
rational criticism. Despite a lack of ostensible justification, an institution
might now be fulfilling social functions of which we are ignorant. Puffed
up with pride in the power of reason, we might fiddle with something
vital to the structure of our society. Instead, we should put our trust in
tradition and "nature." Or, as Burke would put it, "by calling in the aid
of [nature's] unerring and powerful instincts, to fortify the fallible and
feeble contrivances of our reason, we have derived several other, and
those no small benefits from considering our liberties in the light of an
inheritance."93 Thus, traditions which seem contradictory, chaotic, and
irrational should be embraced and defended against the facile wisdom of
those who "[b]y what they call reasoning without prejudice ... leave not
one stone upon another in the fabric of human society. They subvert all
the authority which they hold as well as all that which they have
destroyed. "
This is fine strong stuff. Contemptuous of liberal paeans on the power
of reason, Burke puts his faith in tradition, prejudice, and solid quiet
opinion. Such a theory could support the imposition of oaths to follow
92. I say fragmentary because it would be unfair to caJ1 Mr. Bork a systematic thinker. He
seems uncomfortable with abstractions. This is not necessarily a criticism. In fact, it is the strength
of many of his most interesting arguments. For example, he prefers to argue for moral relativism on
the basis of the number of people who have tried and failed to build an objective moral theory, than
to argue that the fact/norm dichotomy makes it conceptually impossible. In this, he is very like
Burke.
93. BURKE, supra note 85.
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one kind of judicial interpretation-provided only that it be proved to be
traditional. Indeed, such a theory could support the imposition of more
overt conservative oaths to defend the status quo, should that be necessary. Is Mr. Bork a Burkean? Should he be one?
At first sight, the answer to both questions is "no." After all, Mr.
Bork claims that his constitutional philosophy is objectively correct, that
it is neutral in derivation and application, and that it does not represent
the imposition of a particular set of values onto the Constitutional document. This sounds like the sort of attempt to "reason without prejudice"
about social institutions of which Burke was so contemptuous. Yet, as
we have seen, Mr. Bork's arguments for the objective correctness of the
theory of original understanding are philosophically bankrupt, historically unfounded, and practically indeterminate. His account would be
more persuasive if he were to abandon the claims to objective
correctness.
Probably the greatest structural similarity between the ideas of Burke
and Mr. Bork, is their resort to a kind of class analysis. Each sees himself as the defender of a strong but inarticulate tradition against the depredations of an intellectual class drunk on its own wordy theories. 94
Burke's opponent was the reformism, iconoclasm, egalitarianism, and
dangerous rationalism of the parvenu bourgeoisie. He set himself up
against "the delusive plausibilities of moral politicians,"9s saving his
sharpest barbs for what he saw as their mindless love of change for
change's sake. "A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish
temper and confined views. People will not look forward to posterity,
who never looked back to their ancestors. ,,96 Burke argued for the spontaneous, organic and above all traditional process of government, a process which was valuable regardless of whether it was explicable in terms
of the new categories of the rationalists. "All your sophisters cannot produce any thing better adapted to preserve a rational and manly freedom
than the course we have pursued, who have chosen our nature rather
than our speculations, our breasts rather than our inventions, for the
great conservatories and magazines of our rights and privileges. "97
Mr. Bork's villains are the intellectual or knowledge class, but the
opinions that class possesses are exactly the proud, questioning and
94. "Intellectual presumption-<>r self-confidence---is the morale of the revolutionary, whereby
he is enabled to call established order into question, in society, in the State, in the Church, in the
family. This is the way in which ability makes its inroads into property. In using his magnificent
intelligence to deprecate the claims of intelligence, Burke as usual, is discharging a double function.
He serves the interests of the property owners, thus earning their gratitude. And at the same time he
rehabilitates religion, and notably-though discreetly and by indirection-that form of religion
which had most been exposed to the remorseless onslaughts of Reason." C.c. O'Brien, Introduction,
id. at 47.
95. Burke, supra note 85, at 125.
96. Id. at 1l9.
97. Id. at 121.
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rationalist ones that Burke criticized. This is not surprising when one
realizes that it was Burke's parvenu eighteenth century bourgeoisie who
developed the ideology that Bork's knowledge class now expounds. Not
only are the ideas of the knowledge class marked by the hubris of
rational social reform, they are constantly in flux. Sounding a common
note with Justice Taney, Mr. Bork decries the idea that changing sentiments could have any effect on constitutional law. "The assumptions
and ideas of the intellectual class regularly mutate, which means, to the
extent that constitutional law incorporates these assumptions, our fundamental law will shift with fashion" (p. 242). Burke made the same point
about the social reformers of his day, using the same comparison with
fashion.
Not only the traditions of governance, but moral traditions also need
to be defended against the knowledge class's rationalistic tinkering. Like
Burke, Mr. Bork is at his most emphatic when he extols these values. He
argues specifically against the liberal vision of the morally neutral state.
For him society must be able to legislate its moral values if it is not to
"dissolve social bonds" (p. 249). He quotes approvingly Lord Devlin's
dictum: "[w]hat makes a society is a community of ideas, not political
ideas alone but also ideas about the way its members should govern their
lives" (p. 249). Burke would have applauded. The liberal tradition sees
civil society as an empty vessel to be filled with, rather than to shape or
determine, the values and preferences of its citizens. It is precisely this
relativist attitude which gives the state its universal status above any of
the particular groups, parties, or religions which it contains. Burke considered this idea of a neutral universal state a delusion. There could be
no state, no justice, even no understanding, outside of a particular tradition of governance, law, religion, culture and language. The crux of traditions is that they are not "rationaL'" We should protect the social
fabric of our society, from its great institutions of government to its
smallest traditions of personal morals and etiquette, from the rationalist
assault.
In liberal thought, society is a container full of independent actors
with different desires and values. Values and desires may change, just as
different drinks can be put into the same glass, but the society remains.
On the other hand, writing in the tradition of classical republicanism,
Burke and Mr. Bork see each society as an expression of a particular set
of traditional values and assumptions. To destroy those assumptions is
to destroy the society. In fact, the possibility of change in social attitudes
represents such a threat to Mr. Bork that he might support the use of
state force to prevent it. "A change in moral environment-in social
attitudes towards sex, marriage, duties towards children and the likemay surely be felt to be as harmful as the possibility of physical violence
or the absence of proportional representation of ethnic groups in the
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workforce" (p. 247). If we can use the power of the state to prevent the
latter two evils, why not the former? Of course, this represents a
profound contrast with Mr. Bork's earlier views. The current Mr. Bork
has abandoned the libertarian concerns which led him to criticize moral
legislation. He seems to have deserted the liberal world where values
may not be legislated. for the Burkean world where they must be.
Both Burke and Mr. Bork are most effective when they point out the
contradictions in liberal thought. Mr. Bork points out that liberals want
it both ways-to impose their ends-neutral vision of the state, and then to
claim that this vision is not a political or moral vision at all. Score one
for Mr. Bork. He asks how liberals can trumpet their relativistic vision
while at the same time imposing on the country their moral views on
such issues as busing, school prayer, and the "prohibition of father-son
banquets at high-schools." "On the one hand, there appears to be a
degree of morality so severe it amounts to moralism, and, on the other, a
hostility to morality so strong it amounts to moral relativism" (p. 245).
Writing at the beginning of the rise of liberalism and the dawn of the
political Enlightenment, Burke had a similar disdain for the way that the
liberal exaltation of "toleration" played itself out in state policy. "We
hear these new teachers continually boasting of their. spirit of toleration.
That those persons should tolerate all opinions, who think none to be of
estimation, is a matter of small merit. Equal neglect is not impartial
kindness."98 He was particularly incensed at the suggestion of Reverend
Price that those who did not find the Church of England congenial
should set up their own religion.
It is somewhat remarkable that the reverend divine should be so
earnest for setting up new churches, and so perfectly indifferent concerning the doctrine which may be taught in them. His zeal is of a
curious kind. It is not for the diffusion of truth, but for the spreading of contradiction. Let the noble teachers but dissent, it is no matter from whom or from what. This great point once secured it is
taken for granted that their religion will be rational and manly.99
It might be Mr. Bork speaking, taxing liberals for exalting the values of
homosexuals, criminals, and drug users in the name of tolerance and
moral relativism, while they denigrate the values of the moral majority.
The cause of this double standard is the knowledge class's pernicious
egalitarian ethos (p. 245). Both Burke and Bork think that egalitarianism is a corrosive doctrine, weakening the social distinctions and mental
habits on which social stability is founded. Burke called it "that monstrous fiction, which by inspiring false ideas and vain expectations into
men destined to travel in the obscure walk of laborious life, serves only to
98. [d. at 258-59.
99. [d. at 95.
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aggravate and embitter that real inequality which it never can remove;
and which the order of civil life establishes as much for the benefit of
those whom it must leave in an humble state, as those whom it is able to
exalt to a condition more splendid, but not more happy."loo Mr. Bork is
as dismissive, if less florid. "Egalitarianism is hostile to hierarchies and
distinctions. Hence law must be used to weaken or eliminate them, striking at private morality and behavior that is not egalitarian. For entirely
innocent reasons, the preferences and talents of people will not always
produce equality of results. The egalitarian tendency is then to coerce
equality of result by law" (p. 245-6). The best protector of these
"entirely innocent inequalities" is the unquestioning reverence of traditional values which both Burke and Mr. Bork extol.
A desire to defend society from the "delusive plausibilities of moral
politicians," a condemnation of the hubris of rational reformism, a hostility to the epistemology of moral relativism and the liberal vision of a
morally neutral state, an exaltation of tradition against the demands of
egalitarian social thought-all of these unite Burke and Mr. Bork. In
fact, all that divides them is Mr. Bork's lingering but tenuous attachment
to the language of rationalism, the language favored by many of his foes
in the knowledge class.
The language of liberal rationalism conjures up a world where social
realities are objectively knowable facts, while values are relative, subjective and partial. If one accepts these premises, then the epistemological
task is to jump this gap, to reach objective knowledge of the Good, or in
this case, of the Constitution. Various methods are suggested. But
whether the method entails a veil of ignorance or an ideal speech situation, wide reflective equilibrium or participation-reinforcing process theory, it has a single goal: to achieve a kind of knowledge free from
prejUdice and partiality, which does not equate "that which is" and "that
which should be," and which does not have a particular set of values
built into its methodological premises. These goals are the very ones that
part of Bork holds dear. He spends half of his time arguing that his
method gives us access to facts and not values, that it is neutral in derivation and application, and free from prejudice and partiality. He spends
the other half of his time arguing, in the good Burkean manner, in favor
of prejudice and partiality, in favor of the authority of tradition, and in
favor of a state which is not neutral as to moral values, but instead writes
Mr. Bork seems to imagine that
one particular set of values into law.
the contradiction is simply between that which the Constitution proscribes and that which the majority is entitled to do. But it is more than
that. It is a fundamental clash of ideologies, of epistemologies, of political visions. It is the reappearance of this clash within his theory of
100. Id. at 124.
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originalism that marks the failure of his project. After all, if the conservative republican vision of the state is correct, what is wrong with a politically "prejudiced" theory of interpretation and constitutional values? A
modem-day Burke would say that, since all understanding must start
from the values of a particular tradition and a particular social order,
there can be no other kind. 101 On the other hand, if the conservative
vision is wrong, there is no foundation for Bork's reliance on tradition,
his attack on the moral relativism of the knowledge class, or his panegyric upon a state which "must legislate moral values if it is not to dissolve social bonds." He simply cannot have it both ways. He should
give up his lip service to the liberal conventions of argument.
My point here is that Mr. Bork has tried to hold together a fundamentally schizophrenic argument. He has struggled to fit the ideas of traditional conservatism within the framework of liberalism. The lacunae and
contradictions in his book thus represent not simply mistakes, but rather
signs of a deep epistemological tension. What would happen if he simply
jettisoned the liberal rationalist side of his ideas? He would have to abandon his claim that his theory of interpretation is neutral in derivation and
application. He would have to embrace as the final legitimator of his
theory not the "fallible and feeble contrivances of reason," but instead
"prejudice" and tradition. Such an admission would encourage readers
to focus their attention on the profound challenge which this kind of
conservatism represents for the epistemology of liberal rationalism.
What kind of constitutional philosophy would this produce? It would
start from premises rather different from those of liberalism. The
assumption would be that legitimacy could adhere only to the content of
particular social orders, rather than to some general plan of ordered liberty. Thus, in constitutional decision-making and scholarship, there
would be less resort to the abstract reasoning that so infuriates Burke and
Mr. Bork, and more reliance on the values and traditions of this particular society. Liberal analysis purports to start from a place outside any
particular clash of values. Will the Nazis get to march through Skokie,
or can the residents prevent them? Can 2 Live Crew play uncensored in
Florida, or can the local authorities stop them? To resolve these clashes,
liberalism interprets the Constitution as a set of universal norms which
stand on a higher level than any particular clash. It can thus can be
101. Mr. Bork has two contradictory responses to this point: one from his liberal side, the other
from his Burkean side. His first response is to deny that the adoption of his theory is a political
choice or that his theory embodies a particular set of values. In an echo of his bygone Wechslerian
days, he argues that his theory is neutral in derivation and application. His second response is that
the adoption of original understanding is a political choice, but that it was a choice "made long ago
by those who designed and enacted the Constitution" (p. 177). It does embody a particular set of
values, but they are the values ofthe Framers (and enactors). The former argument sufferS from the
philosophical flaws pointed out in section VI. The latter, notwithstanding its perfect circularity, is
undermined by the problems of history discussed in the text accompanying notes 60-66. Finally, of
course, both arguments cannot be true at the same time.
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enforced without violating the injunction that the state should embody
no particular set of political beliefs. lo2 Liberalism casts itself as the
umpire in a clash of ideologies, not as one of the players, not as an ideology itself.
To Mr. Bork, however, it is clear that the norms enforced do in fact
reflect a particular set of political beliefs-those of Professor Tribe and
the knowledge class-and no argument that these norms are immanent
in the constitutional order will convince him. A Burkean constitutional
theory would claim that there are no universal norms of process which
allow us to solve a dispute without, ourselves, entering into the fray.
Instead, we must accept that the state itself embodies a particular set of
value judgements and that realization of these values is a good thing.
Rather than hanging above the clash of ideologies, the state actively promotes a particular path of virtue. This would be a constitutionalism
based on societal traditions, skeptical of claims to universal truth.
This Burkean theory of constitutional law would in some ways resemble recent "republican constitutional theory.,,103 From its inception, the
liberal refrain in American politics and constitutionalism has had a contrapuntal theme of repUblicanism. So far, the majority of republican constitutional scholarship has taken the repUblican injunction to civic virtue
to refer to the "active" virtues of political action and civic participation
in the life of the repUblic. A Burkean repUblicanism would be more concerned with the passive virtues, such as acceptance of one's place in the
hierarchy and conformity to the traditional moral norms of society.
Nevertheless, it would share with its radical repUblican counterpart a
belief that the state cannot be a mere empty vessel, containing the values
of its citizens but not partaking of them.
For the liberal, the state is just a means to an end, a device to maximize individual freedom. For the Burkean, the state is an end in itself.
This difference has radical implications for the question of state interference with individual interests. Both "freedom" and "state" take on a
particular meaning, in the Burkean's case a traditional one.
[W]hile the conservative may require a loose connection between the
state and civil society (looser, say, than that which exists in China),
he will wish to see the state as end and not as means, just as he sees
civil society. The state as means (as administrative machine, or
business enterprise or welfare officer, or whatever) -such a state is
102. The best chroniclers of this aspect of the aspirations of the liberal state are, ironically
enough, Marx and Hegel.

103. See generally Roads Not Taken: Undercurrents of Republican Thinking in Modem
Constitutional Theory, 85 Nw. V.L. REv. I (1990); Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in
American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57 (1987); I. POCOCK, THE
MACHlA VELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC
REPUBLICAN TRADmoN (1975); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.I. 1539
(1988).
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not one to which the citizen can belong. Nor are the ends to which
the state is supposed to be subordinate really capable of description
outside the order which embodies them. This is certainly true of the
liberal end of freedom. Naturally, one's neighbors may interfere
with one, to a greater or lesser extent, but until we are given some
concrete description of the social and political arrangement, it is
impossible to say whether this interference is desirable. The 'interference' proper to a rural community in Zululand is greater than
anything experienced in a Soviet city. Yet it would be sadly misguided to call it a loss of freedom, when subjection to this kind of
interference is precisely what it is to be a Zulu. And as soon as there
is interference, there is a form of rule, and therefore a state, however
loosely constituted. Without some move in this direction, towards
constituted power, a person is neither free nor unfree, but lives like
the nomads of the anarchistic commune, in a perpetual hallucination of freedom that can be translated only into solipsistic acts. 104
Seen in this light, Mr. Bork's views on privacy take on a new coherence.
He has gone from describing Griswold as "a salutary demonstration of
the Court's ability to protect fundamental human values"IOS to describing it as an "unprincipled" and "utterly specious" decision, a "constitutional time-bomb." Mr. Bork's new belief that society must legislate
moral values if it is not to dissolve social bonds (p. 249) is clearly related
to this about-face over privacy. The Burkean Mr. Bork believes there are
compelling reasons for government interference in decisions the liberal
would regard as "personal." For the liberal, the fact that these decisions
are not only intimate but also caught up in (relative) moral judgements is
the reason the state should stay out of them. For the Burkean, on the
other hand, these "moral" views are actually the basis of state and society. Given this perspective, it is hardly surprising that Mr. Bork feels
that "[a] change in moral environment-in social attitudes towards sex,
marriage, duties towards children and the like-may surely be felt to be
as harmful as the possibility of physical violence or the absence of proportional representation of ethnic groups in the workforce" (p. 247). The
issues which had seemed the farthest from the reach of permissible state
interference are revealed to be constitutive of state and society. The picture has reversed itself. Roger Scruton, an English conservative, puts it
particularly well:
[The] individual has become a sophisticated being, anxious for a
sphere of privacy in which to seclude the eccentricities that fulfil
him. His fulfillment, he thinks, is impossible without the "right of
privacy" which Englishmen regard as indefeasible. But what does
this right amount to when unprotected by the state? Nothing.
104.
105.

R. ScRUTON, THE MEANING
Bork, supra note 35, at 8.

OF CONSERVATISM

47 (1984).

308

Yale Journal of Law & the HumanitieS

[Vol. 3: 263

What is fulfillment without the values of a social order? Nothing.
And whas it eccentricity without the norm against which to measure
it? Nothing. This Anglo-Saxon privacy which we esteem is in fact
nothing more than the public order seen from within. It is not the
vacuous freedom of liberalism, but a substantial and enduring thing,
whose content becomes clear only with its limits. 106
Where do those limits come from? In the Burkean world they are
derived from the history, customs, and traditional morality of the particular society. No wonder Mr. Bork has backed away from awarding first
amendment protection to all human behavior, and prohibiting the majority's interference with what it cannot see. To the Burkean, this would
give any minority carte blanche to undermine the web of meaning and
morality on which the society rests. No wonder Mr. Bork now sees the
plaintiff's argument in Bowers v. Hardwick, an argument indistinguishable from the one he himself made in 1968, to be "one more sortie in our
cultural war."
There is another puzzle in Mr. Bork's intellectual history which can be
solved by assuming that he is moving towards a Burkean constitutional
theory. Why do texts become so much clearer, history so much less
ambiguous, as Mr. Bork grows older? When I first read Mr. Bork's work
in chronological order, I had the distinct impression that I was moving
backwards rather than forwards in time. Most people begin by seeing
clarity and determinacy in their studies and then move slowly towards
the recognition of conflict, indeterminacy and vagueness. When Mr.
Bork first looked at original intent, he saw a "naive" attempt to wish
away the complexities and indeterminacy of the historical record.
Twenty years later, the same record was entirely clear to him. Considered as an intellectual progression in interpretive conclusions it seemed
not impossible, but at least counter-intuitive. Yet if looked at, not as a
progression of interpretive theory, but as a fundamental change in political vision, it makes more sense. From the Burkean point of view, the
attractive feature of original understanding is not its specious claim to
"neutrality in derivation and application of principle" but the simple fact
that it attempts to solve questions of value by focusing on history and
tradition. 107
Tradition and history are to be valued for their own sake, not because
they supply an interpretive constitutional method capable of surmount106. SCRUTON, supra note 104, at 189-90.
107. Actually, there is even Burkean precedent for the specific method of original understanding,
although the tone of his remarks is more instructive than their content.
Those who cultivate the memory of our revolution, and those who are attached to the
constitution of this kingdom, will take good care how they are involved with persons who,
under the pretext of zeal towards the Revolution and Constitution, too frequently wander from
their true principles; and are ready on every occasion to depart from the finn but cautious and
deliberate spirit which produced the one and presides in the other. BURKE, supra note 85, at 86.
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ing the fact/value dichotomy. History and tradition do not allow us to
climb out of the web of politics to reach some neutral ground, as the
liberal would attempt to do. They instead constitute the web. For the
Burkean, history and tradition are our society and there is no place
outside of that society to make decisions. Just as Scruton thinks one
cannot talk about the acceptable level of state intrusion without knowing
whether we are talking about the traditions of Zulu or American society,
a Burkean would claim that constitutional interpretation cannot and
should not seek the illusory haven of a neutral method "outside of" politics, but should work from within the "prejudice," history, and tradition
of this society.
There is an obvious and immediate objection to this view of Mr. Bork's
work. As I have already shown, his theory rests on a very shaky historical footing. It could be objected that it is a poor representative of an
ideology which purports to revere tradition. Perhaps this response misunderstands the Burkean vision because it continues to apply the
assumptions of liberal rationalism. Like Mr. Bork, Burke did not have
much respect for the kind of history most professional historians produce. Burke believed that individuals and societies could only exist,
communicate and survive by filtering their present attitudes through the
traditions, myth, and reverence which colored their history. Thus, it is
hardly surprising to find that the history Burke uses to defend his ideas is
an idealized, mythologized, poetic history. He even suggests that, in the
rare cases when political change is necessary, one can pick and choose
among the "histories" which one will use for inspiration. In Burke's
mind, the failure to take this step is the great sin of pride which has
tainted the French Revolution.
[Y]ou chose to act as if you had never been moulded into civil society, and had every thing to begin anew. You began ill, because you
began by despising everything that belonged to you. You set up
your trade without a capital. If the last generations of your country
appeared without much lustre in your eyes, you might have passed
them by and derived your claim from a more early race of ancestors.
Under a pious predilection for those ancestors, your imaginations
would have realized in them a standard of virtue and wisdom,
beyond the vulgar practice of the hour: and you would have risen
with the example to whose imitation you aspired. 108
Bork, unlike the French Revolutionaries, follows Burke's prescription.
Searching for a constitutional theory he acquires a "pious predilection"
for a chosen set of ancestors and imagines "a standard of virtue and wisdom, beyond the vulgar practice of the hour." This is not history. It is
108. Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
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mythopoeia. But in Burke's world, in Giambattista Vico'sl09 world, and
perhaps in Mr. Bork's world, mythopoeia is all there is.ll0
The Burkean history is a chosen history, one that suppresses those features of our "ancient liberties" which do not fit the story. One could
have met Burke on his own ground by pointing out that there were also
strong English 111 traditions towards egalitarianism and social iconoclasm. Equally, there are moments reading Mr. Bork's version of
American history where one might forget that this is a state born in
revolution against a colonial power, a state infused with egalitarian as
well as hierarchical traditions from its very inception. To say this is not
to say that Mr. Bork's history is false by comparison with some absolutely true, egalitarian, radical republican history of the United States.
The post-modernist would say that all histories are "chosen" histories,
and that there is no surcease from the invention and reinvention of our
past.
All this leaves us with one overriding question. I suggest that Mr.
Bork is proposing a reverence towards what amounts to a comprehensive
mythology predicated on the importance of stability and order. He has
chosen a mythologized version of the tradition of constitutional governance, of family life, of "natural" hierarchies, and of the morality of middle America. If this is true, and if in fact the construction of mythologies
is inevitable, why is Mr. Bork not more open in urging the Burkean side
of his ideas?' It is, of course, possible that he is unaware of that side,
unaware that some of his ideas rely on the premises of liberal rationalism
while others challenge those premises. The fragmentary way in which
his Burkeanism appears in his book seems to indicate that this is in fact
the case. In addition, Mr. Bork may have not wish to face this tendency
in his thought. What happens if you are a conservative who begins to
doubt the adequacy of the framework of liberal reason? If you are a
progressive, then there is a certain satisfaction in breaking down the
arguments which support the status quo, in showing that history and
109. G. VICO, THE NEW SCIENCE (M. Fisch & T. Bergin trans. 1968).
110. This is the point where the post-modem gloss on history may be useful. For the postmodernist, there is no choice whether or not to be influenced by past history, tradition, style, and
genre, but there may be a choice of which histories we choose. Where the modernist saw freedom as
coming from a rejection of the forms provided by the past, the post-modernist sees freedom as
existing between the opposing pulls of different traditions. The resulting ,collage can produce a wide
range of effects. Burke deliberately played down the tradition of the Levellers and the Diggers,
bowdlerized the Glorious Revolution, understated nationalist tensions, and minimized the popular
attraction of liberal ideals in order to create his history of the great British traditions of government.
In the hands of a less skilled thinker, his mixture of unreflective royalism, "ancient liberties," natural
law moralism and utilitarian arguments for private property would have seemed ridiculous. In his
hands, it acquires an internal coherency akin to the counter-intuitive logic of fairy-tales. For Burke,
the test of the mixture was its success in fostering stability and order. Yet the same collage approach
can be used to produce exactly the opposite result. The post-modem building, with its Victorian
garrets and ItaIianate columns and minaret cupolas, relies on the architectural traditions of the past,
and yet denies them any absolute authority by juxtaposing them in bizarre and ironic patterns.
lli. To say nothing of Irish, Scottish, and Welsh.
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institutional structure are radically under-determined and thus that "the
way things are" is not inexorable or inevitable. But what if you are a
conservative? What if you come to realize that your strong suit is prejudice rather than reason, mythologized tradition rather than "rational
progress," unquestioning affection rather than rationally-demonstrated
legitimacy? Your position, I would suggest, is a difficult one. Almost, in
fact, a tragic one.
[T]he conservative who has risen above the fragments of his inheritance and reflected on the desolation that has been wrought in it
cannot return to an innocence which his own thinking has
destroyed. He is not in the position of Sartre's existential anti-hero,
forced to take responsibility for a choice which he lacks the concepts
to describe. He knows what he wants, and knows the social order
that would correspond to it. But in becoming self-conscious he has
set himself apart from things. The reasons that he observes for sustaining the myths of his society are reasons which he cannot propagate; to propagate his reasons is to instil the world with doubt.
Having struggled for articulacy, he must recommend silence. 112
Perhaps this is the worm at the heart of Mr. Bork's apple. The reasons
he offers for the philosophy of original understanding are poor ones. Yet
to offer the reasons I have outlined here is to re-enter the skeptical world
of rationalist inquiry and thus to threaten the very myths on which he
would rely. Should he challenge the premises of liberal rationalism
overtly? Should he offer a post-modern conservatism skeptical of the
claims of reason, proud of tradition, convinced of the inevitability of
myth? Or would the propagation of his reasons instil his world with
doubt? It might well turn his readers away from his solutions to the
problems of liberalism and towards those who criticize liberalism from
the left, from faith in equality rather than in hierarchy, towards those
who revere change as much as Mr. Bork reveres stability. Having struggled for articulacy, Mr. Bork chooses silence.
CONCLUSION

What is one to say about Mr. Bork's most recent argument? From the
more obvious perspectives it is a notable failure. It advocates an historically-based mode of interpretation, yet the historical groundwork in it is
poor and sometimes non-existent. It fails markedly to deal with the
strongest theoretical and practical objections to original understanding.
Its coverage of contemporary constitutional legal theory, particularly
conservative legal theory, is cursory and tendentious. The jurisprudential method which forms the heart of the book contradicts Mr. Bork's
own previous writing, and does not have the virtues he claims for it.
112.

SCRUTON.

supra note 104. at 191.
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Poor history, bad logic, personal inconsistency and a method riddled
with aporia and contradiction-it is a fairly depressing list of conclusions. The list is made more depressing when it is counterposed against
the person touchingly revealed by this book, and the scholar revealed by
his earlier books. It seems that at a certain point Mr. Bork decided no
longer to listen to those with whom he disagreed, and decided that
moral, historical and jurisprudential objections to his theories were as
nothing. He became so firmly fixed in his views that he could not even
wonder whether or not his ideas, too, were a contentious and political
litmus test for judges, no matter how right they seemed to him. If true,
this is a loss to us all, Mr. Bork included.
Some might agree with this assessment, but would lay the blame for
the decline in Mr. Bork's scholarship on the trauma of the confirmation
hearings. The book certainly reveals those hearings to have been a painful ordeal which, whatever the merits of the objections to Mr. Bork, had
its own set of unacceptable distortions and mistakes. But in my view the
process of denial started long before the confirmation hearings.
There is in all of Mr. Bork's writing an almost frantic insistence that
the world must be marked out by bright lines. When insistence comes
into conflict with reality, the result is denial: denial of history, of complexity, of the most cogent objections. Denial of the practice of the
Supreme Court, of legal academic consensus, of public opinion. Denial
of practical and theoretical difficulties and, in the end, denial of his own
past work. The mechanism of denial varies. One can deny the importance of the consensus of legal academia by attributing it to a complacent
class interest. "Simplification" allows Dred Scott to become a case which
discredits only substantive due process and not also original understanding. The practice of the Supreme Court can be separated into heresy and
correct doctrine and the former decried. The historical evidence of the
Framers' intention that their understanding should not bind future generations can simply be ignored. Complexity can be denied by claiming
that its recognition would start us on the slippery slope to anarchy or
tyranny. Mr. Bork's own past work may be glossed over quickly. But in
the end, the denial is undeniable, and it tends to undermine itself.
When a theory demands that so much of the world be sacrificed to its
dictates, might it not be the theory, rather than the world, which is in
error? In this essay, I tried to answer that question by going beyond the
obvious contradictions and problems of The Tempting of America.
When that work is set beside Mr. Bork's earlier works, it is clear that all
of them have a similar theme. On one level, all of them deal with the
familiar question of liberal rationalist social theory: Can we simultaneously believe that all social institutions are subject to the test of reason,
and believe that values are SUbjective and arbitrary? If our premise is
that schemes of values cannot be weighed by rational criteria, how can
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we solve the problems of liberty and order? We have seen that his
attempts to address these questions have led him through a succession of
conservative positions.
On the most obvious level, The Tempting ofAmerica is simply the next
step in this long progression, and the weakest argument so far. The
Tempting ofAmerica is unmarred by complexity or nuance. When faced
by insoluble problems, the earlier Mr. Bork would try more subtle arguments. This one resorts to bluff and bluster. Yet on another level, The
Tempting of America is an advance. Each of his previous positions has
accepted the framework of liberal rationalism and attempted to argue
within that framework. I have argued in this essay that The Tempting of
America marks a break, albeit fragmentary and partial, with that tradition, and turns instead to the older ideas of Burkeanism or forward to a
post-modern conservatism.
What is the value of such a turn? One possible answer was prefigured
in my description of the advantages of originalism as a popular conservative theory. If conservatives want only a source of rhetoric and weighty
but spurious argument, original intent and original understanding will do
fairly well, either alone or in conjunction with other schools of conservative rhetoric. Consistent Burkeanism may be unnecessary. There may be
rhetorical advantage to be gained from the language of the other leading
conservative theories, each of which seems to fulfil the criteria for social
analysis under the premises of liberalism. Each allows one to claim that
her political agenda is not merely desirable, but necessary, that it is no
mere preference, but an inescapable and neutral truth.
The same pattern holds true at the level of day-to-day politics. Much
everyday political debate consists of a slinging match between liberals
who appeal to a reified notion of "progress" and conservatives who
appeal to an equally reified notion of "the free market." In such a world,
an openly Burkean, a defiantly post-modern conservative philosophy
would have at least novelty to recommend it. Instead of conducting all
political discussion at one remove----aiming at whatever temporary shelter the opponent has constructed to shield herself from the relativity of
value---one could discuss the political visions themselves. Instead of
arguing about who has isolated the correct neutral principle guiding our
busing decision, one could argue about whether integration would help
or hurt. Instead of coating his arguments with spurious references to the
true meaning of the history of the fourteenth amendment, Mr. Bork
could come right out and reason from his faith in tradition, his trust of,
hierarchies, his unwillingness to disturb the edifice of civil society. I am
not saying this is somehow the only "real" level of discussion: such a
claim would be merely to re-enter the eternal minuet of liberal rationalism. But I do think that it is a more interesting level of the discussion
and that claim might convince where metaphysical bludgeons fail.
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In such a world Mr. Bork would be revealed for the political views
which undoubtedly commend him now to his conservative friends, and
which have held constant despite the apparently radical changes in his
intellectual positions. What are those views? He is an able propagandist
for a view of society which puts implicit trust in hierarchy. He has a firm
belief in the "innocence" of social inequality. Partly this is because he
retains enough of his libertarianism to see a deprivation of freedom only
where there is an intentional nefarious act by a defined individual actor.
Wards Cove 113 offers Mr. Bork no particular villain, and thus he sees
nothing wrong with it. 114 His faith in the "innocence" of social inequality also springs from a belief that the basic processes of society operate in
spontaneous good order. If everything is running normally, what could
be wrong with inequality, even structural inequality? To me, living in a
city where the nature of someone's life can be predicted with a fair degree
of accuracy simply by knowing their race, sex, or class, these beliefs seem
bizarre, crazy even. Mr. Bork's mythologised history is a constant struggle to keep pure the innocent heritage we have been left. My mythologised history is a set of dispersed and occasionally successful attempts
to apply the idea of democracy to some new social institution-generally
over the objections of people like Mr. Bork who have argued successfully
for eons that there are no fewer than seventeen immutable reasons why
the status quo is simultaneously natural, inevitable and just.
There are exceptions, however. He seems to advocate intervention to
maintain a particular vision of morality and family life, without asking
whether the challenges to it are deliberate or structural. Similarly, his
tolerance for hierarchy disappears when he talks about the knowledge
elite rather than the monied elite. His trust in tradition does not extend
to the peculiarly American traditions of egalitarianism and social iconoclasm. Some of these views seem important to me. Most of them seem
both wrong and pernicious. But if Mr. Bork is the herald of a postmodem conservatism, we might actually begin to talk about these issues,
to reveal what conservatism has to offer apart from an unconvincing
claim to the "true meaning" of history, economics, or institutional competence. Best of all, at long last, the Everyman of conservative legal theory could rest from his lifelong process of denial.

lB.
114.

Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
See Dork, Justices Did the Right Thing, L.A. Daily J., July 27, 1989, at 6.

